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HOW THE CREATION OF APPELLATE COURTS
IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES
LIMITED JUDICIAL COMMENT ON EVIDENCE TO THE JURY
By Renée Lettow Lerner*
ABSTRACT
The practice of judicial comment on the evidence has traditionally been
the main form of jury control. Previous scholarly work has focused on the
loss of the power in state courts, and has attributed the decline of judicial
comment to a strict separation of functions between judge and jury and to
regional differences in legal culture. This article examines two jurisdictions
in which the power of comment long remained strong, at least in theory:
the High Court of England, with its predecessors, and the federal courts in
the United States. In both jurisdictions, judicial power to comment has been
limited and in practice reduced, in the federal courts severely. The article
reveals that this limitation developed with the advent of courts of appeal
with separate personnel and especially of appeals in criminal cases.
Lack of appeal, or limited appeal, has been a distinctive trait of
common law systems, particularly in criminal cases. There was no appeal
as of right in criminal cases until 1907 in England, and 1889 in the federal
courts. In the federal system, the early movements to allow appeals in
criminal cases and to limit judicial comment on evidence focused on
controlling one judge: Isaac Parker, U.S. District Judge for the Western
District of Arkansas, who presided over more than 100 trials for capital
crimes occurring in the Indian Territory from 1875 to 1896.
The article suggests that the most important traditional method of jury
control—judicial comment on evidence—has proved to be unworkable in
the judicial culture of the United States and difficult in England. Jury trial
long impeded appeals, but when they arrived, appellate courts limited the
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discretion of trial judges. In doing so, appellate courts focused on
procedures rather than the merits of a case. In contrast, appeals in legal
systems of the Continent of Europe are thorough and focused on the merits.
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INTRODUCTION

The practice of judicial comment on the evidence has traditionally been
the main form of jury control.1 The practice concerns three features typical
of common law systems: the use of lay decision-makers as exclusive judges
of fact, the use of a single professional judge in the first instance, and lack
of thorough appeals on the merits. This article examines two jurisdictions
in which the power of comment long remained strong, at least in theory:
the High Court of England, with its predecessors, and the federal courts in
the United States. In both of these jurisdictions, trial judges have secure
tenure and considerable prestige. In both jurisdictions, judicial power to
comment has been limited and in practice reduced, in the federal courts
severely. The article reveals that this limitation developed with the advent
of courts of appeal with separate personnel. Appeals in criminal cases,
especially, led to limitations on judicial comment on evidence.
Lack of appeal, or limited appeal, has been a distinctive trait of
common law systems, particularly in criminal cases. There was no appeal
as of right whatsoever in criminal cases until 1907 in England2 and 1889 in
the federal courts.3 In England, the development of a court of criminal
appeal with a personnel mostly separate from that of the trial courts did not
occur until 1966.4 In the federal system, the movements to allow appeals in
criminal cases and to limit judicial comment on evidence focused initially
on controlling one judge: Isaac Parker, U.S. District Judge for the Western
District of Arkansas, who presided over more than 100 trials for capital
crimes occurring in the Indian Territory from 1875 to 1896. The opinions
of the Supreme Court reversing convictions for Judge Parker’s comments
on evidence began a long process of limiting judicial comment in the
federal courts.
The article suggests that the most important traditional method of jury
control—judicial comment on evidence—has proved to be unworkable in
the judicial culture of the United States and difficult in England. Jury trial
for centuries impeded appeals, but when they developed, appellate courts
limited the discretion of trial judges. In doing so, appellate courts focused
on procedures rather than the merits of a case. In contrast, appeals in
Continental European legal systems o are thorough and focused on the
merits.

1.
JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 431-33 (2009).
2.
Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. VII, c. 23.
3.
Act of Feb. 6, 1889, c. 113, 25 STAT. 655.
4.
Criminal Appeal Act, 1966; see also D.A. Thomas, The Criminal Appeal Act 1966, 30 M.L.R.
64, 64–65 (1967).
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II. RATIONALES FOR JUDICIAL COMMENT ON EVIDENCE
AND LACK OF APPEAL
Adjudication by ordinary laypersons has long raised concerns, and
these concerns grew more acute as common law systems became more
adversarial. Judges and commentators have argued that lay jurors are apt to
be confused by conflicting evidence, especially in complicated cases.5
Jurors also may be swayed by the superior rhetorical skill of counsel for
one side rather than the merits of a case.6
To help correct these problems, a common law judge traditionally has
the power to sum up the evidence at the end of trial and to comment on the
evidence to the jury. The rationales that have long been given for these
practices, and still are given today, are to prevent juror confusion and to
counteract the partisanship of counsel.7 Tocqueville believed that the
judge’s ability to comment on evidence was crucial to the proper
functioning of juries. He stressed how important it was that the judge help
to guide the jury: “It is he who unravels the various arguments they are
finding it so hard to remember and takes them by the hand to guide them
through procedural intricacies.”8 He acts as “a disinterested arbitrator
between the litigants’ passions.”9 English treatise-writer Joseph Chitty,
whose General Practice went through many American editions in the early
nineteenth century and was a popular reference for American lawyers,
believed judicial comment on evidence was necessary to counter the power
of strong advocacy: “without this assistance from the learned judge, few
juries would, in a contested cause, be able to come to an unanimous
opinion, being frequently left in a state of great perplexity by the influence
of the speeches of the contending leaders.”10 Judge Thomas Ruffin of the
North Carolina Supreme Court also focused on the danger of powerful
advocates. In an 1830 opinion, he explained that “after the able and
ingenious, but interested and partial arguments of Counsel,” justice would
be better served by the judge following with “his own calm, discreet,

5.
Jack B. Weinstein, The Power and Duty of Federal Judges to Marshall and Comment on the
Evidence in Jury Trials and Some Suggestions on Charging Juries, 118 F.R.D. 161, 166 (1988); see
also Renée Lettow Lerner, The Failure of Originalism in Preserving Constitutional Rights to Civil Jury
Trial, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 811, 849–50 (2014).
6.
See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 5, at 166.
7.
Id. For a modern criticism of the judicial power to comment, see Stephen A. Saltzburg, The
Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial Judge, 64 VA. L. REV. 1, 34-46 (1978) (arguing
that judicial comment on evidence threatens the independence of the jury and the adversarial system).
8.
1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 275 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence
trans., HarperCollins 1988) (1850).
9.
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 8.
10.
3 JOSEPH CHITTY, THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN ALL ITS DEPARTMENTS 913 (1836).
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sensible and impartial summary of the case, including both law and fact.”11
The judge should “aid[] the jury[] by rescuing the case from the false
glosses of powerful advocates.”12
A problem with these practices of judicial summing up and comment is
that in common law systems, usually only one professional judge hears a
trial. That judge may be biased, lazy, corrupt, or incompetent. No judicial
colleagues are present in courts of the first instance to help correct such
errors. The judicial summing up or comments on the evidence may
therefore mislead the jury and cause or contribute to an improper verdict.
Misleading judicial summing up or comment on the evidence might be
corrected on appeal. But appeal has long been a weakness of common law
systems. Jury verdicts do not lend themselves to appellate review. As a
group of laypersons inexperienced in the law and evaluation of facts, a jury
is not required to give reasons for what it does. A jury speaks unanimously,
and mysteriously, like an oracle. One cannot subject the oracle at Delphi to
appellate review. The common law, when it has permitted review at all,
focuses on inputs, not outputs: whether particular evidence or judicial
instructions should have gone to a jury, rather than the merits of the jury’s
decision.
In the eighteenth century, common law courts did not have courts of
appeal with separate personnel; judges who presided over trials sat together
to correct error.13 There was therefore the danger of less thorough review.
In civil cases, appeals were often hampered by technical restrictions.
(Throughout this article, I refer to various methods of review as “appeal,”
even though technically the methods were writ of error, bill of exceptions,
and other procedures.) In criminal cases, there was no review as of right at
all until very late: 1889 in the U.S. federal courts in capital cases,14 and

11.
State v. Moses, 13 N.C. 452, 458 (1830). Ruffin came from the Virginia tidewater elite and had
studied, like his fellow Virginian James Madison, at the College of New Jersey (later Princeton).
TIMOTHY S. HUEBNER, THE SOUTHERN JUDICIAL TRADITION: STATE JUDGES AND SECTIONAL
DISTINCTIVENESS, 1790-1890, 131-35 (Kermit Hall ed.1999).
12.
State v. Moses, 13 N.C. at 462. The judge was well-suited to do this, in Ruffin’s view, because
typically he was “upright, learned, and discreet” and “habituated to the investigation of complicated
masses of testimony, often contradictory, and often apparently so but really reconcilable.” Id.
Elucidations from such a judge would be “of infinite utility to a conscientious jury in arriving at just
conclusions.” Id. at 458.
13.
LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 248, 256. The system of review in common law
courts was complicated, with King’s Bench exercising a special supervisory role. See J.H. BAKER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 82-85, 135-54, 521-23 (4th ed. 2005); ROSCOE POUND,
APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 57-60 (1941). American colonists associated the word
“appeal” with equity and the prerogative courts. Mary S. Bilder, The Origin of the Appeal in America,
48 HASTINGS L.J. 913, 951-61 (1997).
14.
Act of Feb. 6, 1889, c. 113, 25 STAT. 655.
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1891 in other cases,15 and 1907 in England.16 These appeals were only for
convictions; because of the double jeopardy rule, a verdict of acquittal was
final. As will be seen, an important objection to appeals in criminal cases
was the delay and uncertainty of outcome. Judges in both England and the
United States protested that appeals in criminal cases would reduce the
certainty and swiftness of punishment needed for effective deterrence.
The common law courts tried to justify, or compensate for, the lack of
appeal in various ways. These included:


The unanimity of the jury. Twelve of one’s peers had to agree on the
verdict.



Comment on evidence by the trial judge to try to prevent the jury from
going astray.



The prestige of the trial bench. In England, the highest common law
judges traveled the circuits and served as trial judges.17 In the federal
courts, Supreme Court justices rode circuit around the country and
served as trial judges in the most important cases.18



The use of panels of judges in the first instance. This was not so much
done in England except in treason cases,19 but it was relatively
common in the United States. At first, the main federal trial courts,
called the circuit courts, were set up to use three or two trial judges, at
least one of whom was a Supreme Court justice.20 Various states used a
similar model.21



Executive clemency, following a criminal conviction.22

If review did occur and error was found, typically the remedy was the
time-consuming and expensive new trial. The sources of error that could
trigger a new trial grew over time, as judges converted what previously had
been questions of fact into questions of law through ever-more elaborate
jury instructions.23 The expense and delay of new trials encouraged

15.
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, c. 517, § 5, 26 STAT. 826, 827–28. Many of the states established
appellate review in criminal cases considerably earlier. See LESTER B. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN
AMERICA 213-23 (1939).
16.
Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. VII, c. 23.
17.
See infra Part III.A.
18.
See infra Part IV.A.1.
19.
See LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 663–64.
20.
See infra Part IV.A.1.
21.
See ROSCOE POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 111-15 (1940).
22.
See LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 626–28.
23.
See id. at 448-50; Renée B. Lettow, New Trial for Verdict Against Law: Judge-Jury Relations
in Early Nineteenth-Century America, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 542-53 (1996); Richard Danzig,
Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 254-56, 27274 (1975).
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judicial comment on the evidence and even stronger related forms of jury
control such as directed verdict.24 The lack of thorough appeal and efficient
remedy encouraged a procedure for jury control that in turn sometimes
needed correction. Judges focused ever more on procedures and less on
merit. This is a cycle familiar to historians of the common law.
Contrast this situation with the nonadversarial systems of the Continent
of Europe. The civil courts of Germany can serve as an example. In
important cases, there may be a panel of judges in the first instance.25 The
first appeal is to a court with separate personnel and is thorough on the
merits. The standard is de novo review of both findings of fact and
conclusions of law.26 Courts of appeal may find facts and enter a new
judgment without remanding to the court below.27
Gradually, the legal systems of the common law world began to correct
their deficiencies concerning appeal. They slowly moved closer to the
Continental model. The common law systems created courts of appeal with
separate personnel and reduced technical restrictions—and eliminated some
outright prohibitions—on appeals. The process is not complete; there is still
deference to the court of first instance respecting factual findings, and cases
are often remanded for new trial and other proceedings. Appeals, however,
became more regular and thorough.
The difficulty was that the common law systems retained the use of lay
decision makers, the adversarial system, and single judges of the first
instance. Appellate courts began to curtail the power of the trial judge over
the jury and second-guessed judicial comments. As has been seen, judges
and commentators have believed judicial comments were necessary to
prevent confusion of lay jurors and improper influence of advocates.
Because of more thorough appeals, trial judges increasingly refrained from
thorough summing-up or comments, and juries were left to cope with the
evidence and arguments of counsel without guidance. The trial judge
operated as less of a check on the adversarial system.
Previous studies of the history of comment on evidence have focused
on the loss of the power in state courts. Kenneth Krasity emphasized
mainly the period from 1835 to 1860 and attributed the loss of the power in
many states to a growing importance of separation of functions between

24.
Renée Lettow Lerner, The Rise of Directed Verdict: Jury Power in Civil Cases Before the
Federal Rules of 1938, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 448, 459-60, 478-93 (2013) [hereinafter Lerner,
Directed Verdict].
25.
John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 850-51
n.94 (1985).
26.
Langbein, supra note 25, at 855-57.
27.
Id. at 857.
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judge and jury.28 In an earlier article, I stressed regional differences and
highlighted the distinctive legal culture of the South and West, with its
aggressive bar.29 Scholars have observed that the power of federal courts to
comment on evidence was considerably stronger than that of many state
courts.30
This article emphasizes the development of courts of appeal with
separate personnel in England and the federal courts. In both jurisdictions,
this change was largely complete in the late nineteenth century. Trial
judges lost prestige relative to appellate judges, and their powers to
comment were limited. The gap between trial and appellate judges—and
limitations on the power to comment—was more noticeable in the federal
courts than in England. In both English and federal courts, the most
dramatic limitations in the power to comment came after the development
of appeals in criminal cases.
In Part III, the article describes the strong judicial power to comment in
England in the eighteenth century. The structure of English courts at the
time—with trial judges reviewing cases—aided this power. As the
adversarial system grew stronger, especially after 1836 when defense
counsel in criminal cases gained the ability to make arguments to the jury,31
the trial judges’ summing up was viewed as more pro-prosecution than it
had been formerly.
With the Judicature Acts of 1873-1875,32 England created appellate
courts with largely separate personnel from those of the trial courts.
However, the prestige of the trial bench remained strong, and its tenure is
secure. Nearly all appellate judges in England were trial judges for a
substantial period; England uses a promotional model. England has
virtually eliminated jury trial for civil cases. In criminal cases, appeal as of
right for convictions was not permitted until 1907.33 Even then, the Court
of Criminal Appeal was at first staffed exclusively with trial judges. After
1966, the appellate court used largely separate personnel,34 and restrictions
on comment grew more significant. English judges regularly sum up the

28.
Kenneth Krasity, The Role of the Judge in Jury Trials: The Elimination of Judicial Evaluation
of Fact in American State Courts from 1795 to 1913, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 595, 595-96 (1985).
29.
Renée Lettow Lerner, The Transformation of the American Civil Trial: The Silent Judge, 42
WM. & MARY L. REV. 195, 199-203 (2000).
30.
See, e.g., SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, CHARGING THE JURY 65-66, 68-72 (St. Louis, William H.
Stevenson 1880); Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, The Article III Jury, 87 VA. L. REV. 587,
645-49 (2001).
31.
6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114, § 1.
32.
Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66; Supreme Court of Judicature Act,
1875, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77.
33.
Criminal Appeal Act 1907, 7 Edw. VII, c. 23.
34.
Criminal Appeal Act, 1966; Thomas, supra note 4.
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evidence for the jury, and retain the power to comment on evidence today,
although the power is less frequently used.
The article then turns in Part IV to the power to comment on evidence
in federal courts in the United States. Because of the circuit system,
Supreme Court justices regularly sat as trial judges through the late
nineteenth century. During this period the Court put few restrictions on
judicial comment on evidence. Indeed, the Court held in many cases that
judicial comment on fact was not reviewable at all.35 The Court rejected the
idea that federal trial courts were bound by state laws and constitutional
provisions restricting or prohibiting judicial comment on evidence. By the
end of the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth, the Court
declared that the phrase “trial by jury” in the U.S. Constitution meant a trial
in which a judge had the power to assist the jury with observations on
fact.36
The rule that the Supreme Court would not review a trial judge’s
comments on fact changed after the Court began to hear appeals in capital
criminal cases in 1889.37 The 1889 act was passed in large part to control
one judge: Isaac C. Parker, U.S. district judge for the Western District of
Arkansas. For many, Judge Parker represented the dangers of immense
judicial power concentrated in one person, uncontrolled by review. Judge
Parker’s district encompassed a large amount of Indian Territory, and there
he had jurisdiction over all criminal cases committed by or against a nonIndian. He was determined to create respect for law and order in his unruly
district, and he presided over many capital trials and dozens of executions.
Until 1889, none of the convictions was subject to appeal.
After 1889, the Supreme Court reviewed almost fifty capital cases from
Judge Parker’s court and reversed three dozen.38 Several of these reversals
were significant because of the Court’s objections to Parker’s comments on
fact to the jury. These cases were cited repeatedly in later decisions by the
federal courts of appeals reversing convictions because of a trial court’s
comments on evidence.39 The leading modern case on comment on
evidence in the federal courts, Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 455
(1933), draws heavily on the holdings of the Court’s cases reversing Judge
Parker.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See infra Part IV.A.2.
See infra Part IV.A.3.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
See infra Part IV.C.2.
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III. ENGLAND
A. Structure of the Courts Through the Mid-Nineteenth Century and the
Practice of Judicial Comment on Evidence
At common law in England, every judge was both a trial judge and a
member of a collegial court deciding questions of law. The basic structure
of the English common law courts was established by the fourteenth
century and endured until the Judicature Acts of the 1870s. The structure
was not consciously designed, but grew gradually. Each judge of the three
common law courts—Common Pleas, King’s Bench, and Exchequer—both
presided over trials as a single judge and sat with his colleagues to hear
initial pleadings and to decide post-trial motions and to enter judgment.
When sitting collegially, each court functioned, in effect, as a court of
appeal deciding questions of law.40
In a civil case, a writ issued out of one of the common law courts at
Westminster ordering a sheriff to summon a jury in the county where the
events occurred. One of the common law judges—from any of the courts—
or an experienced member of the bar then presided over the trial, moving
from town to town on a judicial circuit. A party could file post-trial
motions, such as a motion for new trial, for the full court to decide,
essentially as a court of appeal. This was called the nisi prius system
because of the name of the writ informing a sheriff that a jury verdict
would be taken in a case.41
Matthew Hale, Chief Justice of King’s Bench in the late seventeenth
century, described the advantages of the circuit system. The judges enjoyed
close professional relationships while they sat together at Westminister
Hall during the four law terms. This closeness during the terms carried
benefits when the judges travelled the circuits. “[B]y this means their
judgments and their administrations of common justice carry a consonancy,
congruity and uniformity one to another, whereby both the laws and the
administrations thereof are preserved from that confusion and disparity that
would unavoidably ensue, if the administration was by several
incommunicating hands, or by provincial establishments . . . .”42
Centralized judges travelling out to the provinces maintained uniformity of
law and practice. They also served as a direct reminder to the populace all
over England of the power of the kingdom’s central authority over such
crucial matters as serious crime and property rights. As the highest judges

40.
LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 256.
41.
Id. at 123.
42.
MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 162 (Charles M. Gray,
ed. 1971) (1713). This work was published posthumously; Hale died in 1676.
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in the land, they carried great prestige wherever they went. The judgments
of the courts were to be respected as a result.
The judges of all the common law courts came together to discuss
certain issues of law. For civil cases, the judges met in an institution known
as Exchequer Chamber.43 By the mid-nineteenth century, the sittings of
Exchequer Chamber were regularized, occurring after each law term.44 By
this time, too, the principle of judges not sitting in appeal on cases they had
decided below had taken hold. In Exchequer Chamber, therefore, errors and
appeals from each common law court were heard only by the judges of the
other two courts.45
By the eighteenth century, the English bench enjoyed a reputation for
competence and had considerable prestige. As there were few common law
judges—between a dozen and fifteen at a time, for the entire nation—the
power of any one judge was great, and so was his income. Leading
members of the bar were eager to become judges. Furthermore, over the
course of the eighteenth century, English judges attained a secure position
of independence.46
English judges routinely gave juries their opinion about the evidence in
both civil and criminal cases.47 Matthew Hale explained that judicial
comment on evidence was a vital aid to jury trial. He wrote that a judge not
only directed the jurors on matters of law, but the practice of comment
allowed the judge “in Matters of Fact, to give them a great Light and
Assistance by his weighing the Evidence before them, and observing where
the Question and Knot of the Business lies, and by showing them his
Opinion even in Matter of Fact, which is a great Advantage and Light to
Lay Men.”48 Based on study of a judge’s notebooks from the 1750s, John
Langbein concluded that “the judge routinely dominated jury verdicts.” 49

43.
There was an analogous procedure for criminal cases, the case reserved, initiated solely at the
discretion of the trial judge. See infra text accompanying notes 126-128.
44.
Act of 1830, 11 Geo. IV & 1 Will. IV, c. 70. See First Report of the English Judicature
Commission, 1869, reprinted in 5 MASS. L.Q. 254, 283 (1920).
45.
Act of 1830, 11 Geo. IV & 1 Will. IV, c. 70; First Report of the English Judicature
Commission, supra note 44.
46.
LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 655-57.
47.
JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ANGLO-AMERICAN
SPECIAL JURIES 12-13 (2006) (describing Mansfield’s comments to the jury in civil cases) [hereinafter
OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY]; see also THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE 139
(1985); JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 321-22 (2003) [hereinafter
LANGBEIN, ORIGINS]; LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 431–36; 1 JAMES OLDHAM, THE
MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 150,
206 (1992) [hereinafter OLDHAM, MANSFIELD]; John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law
of Evidence: A View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1193 (1996) [hereinafter
Langbein, Evidence].
48.
HALE, supra note 42, at 164-65.
49.
Langbein, Evidence, supra note 47, at 1193.
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“He guided the jurors to his views on the facts and the law, and he seems to
have had an informal, conversational relationship with the jurors that
allowed him to ‘turn up the heat’ if he thought the jury was inclining
against his views.”50 James Oldham has written that although the
eighteenth-century jury was not legally obliged to follow a judge’s
direction, “trial judges did frequently direct juries to find for one party or
the other, and juries ordinarily complied.”51
The style and content of judicial comment varied widely. Lord
Mansfield, Chief Justice of King’s Bench, was praised for presenting
complicated cases to juries clearly and succinctly.52 Mansfield was known
for his use of special juries of merchants in commercial cases.53 Together in
a sort of partnership, Mansfield and these special jurors furthered the useful
development of commercial law, especially insurance law.54 Mansfield’s
successor, Lord Kenyon, held strong religious beliefs and declared them
from the bench in certain cases. His comments to juries were especially
powerful in actions for criminal conversation, a civil claim by a husband
against his wife’s lover. According to The Times of London, in one such
case in 1794, Howard v. Bingham, Kenyon deplored “the immorality of a
libertine age” and told the jurors that one of his chief goals as a judge was
to make “the law of the land subservient to the laws of morality and
religion.”55 He said he found that “[j]uries co-operate with me” in that
endeavor.56 Even so, Kenyon could be nuanced in his recommendations
concerning damages in cases for criminal conversation.57 He expressed

50.
Id.
51.
OLDHAM, MANSFIELD, supra note 47, at 150. Mansfield told James Boswell that juries
followed his direction “except in political causes where they do not at all keep themselves to right and
wrong.” Id. at 206, (quoting 6 THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF JAMES BOSWELL FROM MALAHIDE CASTLE 109
(G. Scott & F.A. Pottle eds. 1928)).
52.
OLDHAM, MANSFIELD, supra note 47, at 87.
53.
OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 47, at 153.
54.
Id. at 153-54; JAMES OLDHAM, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF MANSFIELD 20-22
(2004). The use of special juries of merchants continued through the mid-nineteenth century. OLDHAM,
TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 47, at 154-173; James Oldham, Jury Research in the English Reports in
CD-ROM, in “THE DEAREST BIRTHRIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND”: THE JURY IN THE HISTORY OF
THE COMMON LAW 134-44 (John W. Cairns & Grant McLeod eds., 2002).
55.
Law Report, THE TIMES, Mar. 6, 1794, at 2 (reporting on the case of Howard v. Bingham). I
owe the references to Kenyon to James Oldham.
56.
Id.
57.
“Causes of this kind have very different complexions, causes have come before me, where I
have thought it incumbent on Juries to discharge plaintiffs with small damages. Causes of this kind have
come before me, where I have thought the very cause of action failed, and therefore the plaintiff has
been nonsuited. There have also been causes of this sort where Juries have given very large damages.”
Id. There were occasional protests after Kenyon pressed the jury for large damages. One juror in
another criminal conversation case before Lord Kenyon explained in a letter to The Times in 1798 that
he had followed Kenyon’s instructions and awarded large damages, despite the juror’s doubts, only to
have the verdict ridiculed afterward. A Juror, Letter to the Rt. Hon. Lord Kenyon, THE TIMES, Mar. 26,
1798, at 3.
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sympathy for the lovers as well as the husband in the unusual
circumstances of Howard v. Bingham, and stated to the jury: “I should give
damages, not merely nominal damages, but damages not to a very large
amount.”58 The amount claimed was £10,000; the jury awarded £1,000.59 In
another case of criminal conversation, Kenyon suggested to the jury that
the conduct of the husband, in ignoring his young wife’s behavior as “an
absolute strumpet, frequenting all the fashionable places of vice and
dissipation,” should result in a verdict for the defendant.60 The jury gave a
verdict for the plaintiff for 1s.61
B. The Elimination of Civil Jury Trial in England
English judges’ power to comment on evidence played an important
role in virtually eliminating the civil jury there, a process beginning in the
mid-nineteenth century and extending into the twentieth. As Conor Hanly
has explained, the English legal profession had confidence that English
judges were on the whole impartial and competent.62 Members of the
English legal profession and others also increasingly criticized jurors as
incompetent to decide complicated disputes.63 As English judges already
dominated juries thanks to judicial powers to sum up and to comment on
evidence,64 it was a small additional step to eliminate juries and to save the
trouble and expense. In 1850, The Times of London declared that in 99
cases out of 100, the verdict turned more on the judge than the jury, and the
“mere pantomimical expression of disgust or incredulity on the part of the
presiding magistrate will be sufficient to neutralize the hypothesis of an
advocate, or to shake the testimony of a witness,” as the jurors understand
that “the Judge advocates the cause of truth alone.”65
C. Comment in Criminal Cases
In criminal cases, although overt judicial comment on evidence became
rarer, judges’ summing up remained important and became more elaborate.
These changes seem to have been closely entwined with the advent and
growing powers of defense counsel. John Langbein detected a shift in

58.
Law Report, supra note 55.
59.
Id.
60.
Law Report, THE TIMES, June 21, 1799, at 3 (reporting on the case Henderson v. Tempest).
61.
Id.
62.
Conor Hanly, The Decline of Civil Jury Trial in Nineteenth Century England, 26 J. LEGAL
HIST. 253, 255–58 (2005).
63.
Hanly, supra note 62, at 261–62, 265.
64.
Id. at 258–59.
65.
THE TIMES, Mar. 29, 1850, at D4, quoted in Hanly, supra note 62, at 259.
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attitude toward judicial comment in the second half of the eighteenth
century, as defense counsel became more prevalent. “[T]he bench became
more circumspect about advising juries on the merits.”66 Legal
commentaries reflected this change, and some advised judges to refrain
altogether from comment on the merits.67
Judges, however, seem to have felt a growing need to sum up the
evidence for the jury in detail. Again, this development arose in tandem
with the increasing role of defense counsel. In the 1730s, defense counsel
began to be permitted to examine and cross-examine witnesses,68 and
cross-examination by defense counsel took on greater importance as the
eighteenth century progressed.69 The intensity of this cross-examination
rendered the judge more passive during trial and trials more complicated.70
More complicated cross-examination seems to have spurred judges to want
to clarify testimony and issues for the jury at the end of the trial. The
practice of detailed judicial summing up was well-established by the early
nineteenth century.71 Although prosecution counsel, if there was any,
described for the jury at the beginning of the trial what evidence he planned
to introduce, before 1836 the only legal professional who spoke to the jury
after the evidence was heard was the judge.
Detailed judicial summing up would have become even more important
because of another power of defense counsel. In a statute of 1836, often
referred to as the Prisoners’ Counsel Act, defense counsel gained the right
to address the jury in felony trials.72 The statute had a long legislative
history, with extensive debates in Parliament from the early 1820s through
the mid-1830s. Three modern scholars have addressed this history at

66.
LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 47, at 322.
67.
Id. at 322-23.
68.
John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 311 (1978).
69.
LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 47, at 291-96.
70.
Id. at 313–14. David Wolchover has speculated that cross-examination may have encouraged
judges to keep more careful notes during trial, to resolve clashes between counsel over what exactly a
witness had said previously. These detailed notes would have facilitated judicial summing up of
evidence for the jury. David Wolchover, Should Judges Sum Up on the Facts?, 1989 CRIM. L. R. 781,
783.
71.
In Parliamentary debates on the role of defense counsel, speakers on either side regularly
referred to the judicial practice of summing up. See, e.g., 15 PARL DEB., HC (2d ser.) (1826) 599 (Eng.)
(statement of the Attorney General, John Copley) (“The evidence on both sides having been heard, the
judge, not as counsel, as was erroneously supposed, for either the prisoner or the Crown, but placed
where he was, impartially to administer justice, summed up, and taking a calm, dispassionate, and
collected view of the case, and going regularly through the evidence, submitted it to the jury . . . .”); id.
at 617 (statement of Mr. Tindal) (“[T]he facts were summed up by the judge, who left them to the jury
in the most unbiased and unimpassioned manner.”); id. at 624 (statement of Mr. Scarlett) (“He agreed
with his learned friend, that the administration of justice in this country was pure and unbiased; and he
knew no picture more sublime, than that of chief baron Thompson, while engaged in unraveling the
evidence, and stating the case to the jury.”).
72.
Trials for Felony Act, 1836, 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114, § 1.
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length.73 These scholars have tended to stress one argument of opponents of
the measure: If defense counsel were permitted to address the jury, counsel
for both sides would become more fiercely partisan and the truth would be
lost, often to the detriment of the defendant.74
Another important argument of opponents of the measure, however,
concerned the behavior of judges. A significant objection to this statute was
that the rhetoric of defense counsel, with possible misstatements of
evidence, would provoke judicial remarks to the jury criticizing the defense
and supporting the prosecution. These judicial remarks would often carry
great weight with the jury. In the Parliamentary debates in 1826, several
speakers opined that at that time, in the absence of defense counsel
addressing the jury, judges were either neutral or favored the defense.75
Some speakers claimed that such a judicial attitude would not be likely to
survive the rhetoric of defense counsel. John Copley, the Attorney General,
argued that the excesses of defense counsel might require the judge to
comment disapprovingly, “and, in so doing, he would not be unlikely, in
the heat of his address (for judges were but human), to create, however
unintentionally, an impression unfavourable to the prisoner in the minds of
the jury.”76 Robert Peel, then Home Secretary and a vigorous proponent of
criminal law reform, particularly of reducing the number of capital
offenses, agreed: “If counsel were allowed to address the jury in favour of
the prisoner, the judges would feel and act on the trial differently from their
present usual impartiality, and indulgence to the prisoner.”77
The problem of judges appearing to favor the prosecution in an effort
to counteract defense rhetoric concerned members of the bench and led
many of them to oppose the measure.78 In 1834, Mr. Justice Park, an
opponent of the measure, explained this difficulty:

73.
DAVID J.A. CAIRNS, ADVOCACY AND THE MAKING OF THE ADVERSARIAL CRIMINAL TRIAL
1800-1865, 67-97 (1998); ALLYSON N. MAY, THE BAR AND THE OLD BAILEY, 1750–1850, 176-201
(2003); John M. Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 9 LAW. & HIST. REV. 221, 250-58 (1991).
74.
CAIRNS, supra note 73, at 69; MAY, supra note 73, at 178; Beattie, supra note 73, at 252–54.
See also 15 PARL DEB., HC (2d. Ser.) (1826) 599 (Eng.) (statement of John Copley) (fearing that
counsel would “convert the court into an arena . . . where, instead of endeavoring to elicit the truth by a
reference to plain facts, or the real merits of the case, the time of the public would be wasted by contests
between the counsel on either side, animated, as they would be, by all the excitement, zeal, and
pertinacity, which such contests usually inspired”).
75.
15 PARL DEB., HC (2d ser.) (1826) 601 (Eng.) (statement of the Attorney General, John
Copley); id. at 606–07 (statement of Robert Peel); id. at 617 (statement of Mr. Tindal). See also
CAIRNS, supra note 73, at 112–13.
76.
Id. at 601 (statement of John Copley). David Cairns has discussed this argument by Copley.
CAIRNS, supra note 73, at 69.
77.
15 PARL DEB., HC (2d ser.) (1826) 606 (Eng.) (statement of Robert Peel).
78.
CAIRNS, supra note 73, at 113-17.
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If you have speeches for prisoners, you change immediately the
nature of things; it is the duty of the judge to watch for the
prisoner’s benefit, and take every objection for their benefit;
instead of that, there will be some young gentleman making
speeches, and talking of things quite extraneous, and that will turn
the judge immediately into the prosecutor’s counsel, to prevent
false topics being made use of to the defeat of justice.79
The Act complicated the judicial task of summing up the evidence. In
implementing the Act in 1837, the common law judges determined that
prosecution counsel could reply following arguments by defense counsel,
even if no evidence was introduced for the defendant.80 Judges therefore
had to take into account in their summing up two speeches by opposing
counsel after presentation of evidence.
The concern about judicial remarks seeming to favor the prosecution
proved prescient. Some English judges developed the reputation of
summing up strongly in favor of the prosecution. In the most recent Bench
Book, published in 2010, the Judicial Studies Board believed it necessary
to warn judges against a one-sided summing up for the prosecution.81
The practice of summing up became more directive over time, as
judges moved from simply reading their trial notes in the early- and midnineteenth century to marshalling the evidence in the late nineteenth
century. The earlier practice was simply to read trial notes to the jury with
minimal direction.82 In 1848, the author of a treatise criticized the “too
common mode of summing up” by “many able, but somewhat lazy
judges”: “’Gentlemen, if you think so and so, you will find for the plaintiff,
if you think otherwise, you will find for the defendant; gentlemen, the

79.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE RECEIPT AND EXPENDITURE OF COUNTY RATES, REPORT, 1834,
H.C. 14-I, at 143 (U.K.), quoted in CAIRNS, supra note 73, at 114-15.
80.
MAY, supra note 73, at 199.
81.
JUDICIAL STUDIES BOARD, CROWN COURT BENCH BOOK: DIRECTING THE JURY 6 (2010)
(declaring, in a section entitled “Balance”: “A one-sided summing up is not likely to be a fair summing
up. The judge is not required to ignore the fact, if it is the fact, that the defendant’s case appears to be at
odds with the prevailing evidence, but it is not his job to support or to appear to support the prosecution
at the expense of fair and independent consideration of the evidence by the jury.”).
82.
Charles Dickens described this satirically as “the old-established and most approved form.”
CHARLES DICKENS, PICKWICK PAPERS, ch. 34 (1837). In the fictional case Bardell v. Pickwick, the trial
judge “read as much of his notes to the jury as he could decipher on so short a notice, and made running
comments on the evidence as he went along. If Mrs. Bardell were right, it was perfectly clear that Mr.
Pickwick was wrong, and if they thought the evidence of Mrs. Cluppins worthy of credence they would
believe it, and if they didn’t, why, they wouldn’t. If they were satisfied that a breach of promise of
marriage had been committed, they would find for the plaintiff with such damages as they thought
proper; and if, on the other hand, it appeared to them that no promise of marriage had ever been given,
they would find for the defendant with no damages at all.” Id. Lord Devlin commented that Charles
Dickens’s son, Sir Henry Dickens, stuck close to this model when he was on the bench. PATRICK
DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 118 (3d ed. 1966).
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question is for you.’”83 The author worried that, in complicated cases, this
method of summing up “is almost tantamount, if not to a direct denial of
justice, at least to a decision of the issue by lot.”84 To prevent juror
confusion, writers recommended marshalling the evidence instead:
describing the evidence to the jury not in the order in which it was given at
trial, but as it pertained to each issue to be proved.85 Lord Alverstone, who
was called to the bar in 1868 and elevated to the bench in 1900, explained
that, before he went on the bench, the old practice of judges reading from
their notes without arrangement began to give way to the practice of
marshalling the evidence, and as a judge he followed the “new practice.”86
Simply reading from trial notes, however, remained a tempting option for
judges, as it involved less work than marshalling the evidence.87
Authors observed that the summing up—aside from any obvious
comment on evidence—could be highly influential with the jury. “Quite
apart from any expression of opinion by the judge, the way in which he
marshals the facts and gets rid of irrelevancies may present a strongly
persuasive argument for one side or the other—and it must be remembered
that it is the judge who has the real ‘last word’ with the jury.”88 Trial judges
had widely varying styles of summing up and comment. Although

83.
JOHN P.
AND IRELAND 28

TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND
(A. Maxwell & Son 1848).
84.
TAYLOR, supra note 83. The writer recommended that a judge temperately state to the jury his
opinion of the merits of the case, and the reasons for his opinion. The judge was no more liable to be
prejudiced or partial than the jury, and his “long experience in courts of justice must, of necessity, have
rendered him far more competent than they can be, to unravel the tangled threads of conflicting
testimony.” Id.
85.
Writers called this “predigesting” or “dissecting” the evidence. See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS,
THE PROOF OF GUILT: A STUDY OF THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL 303 (3d ed. 1963) (“predigest”);
DEVLIN, supra note 82 (“[A] jury probably finds some dissection of the evidence more helpful—
something which extracts the issue to be proved and segregates the material relating to each.”).
86.
LORD ALVERSTONE [RICHARD WEBSTER], RECOLLECTIONS OF BAR AND BENCH 289 (1915).
87.
See DEVLIN, supra note 82; Wolchover, supra note 70, at 784. In 1981, Lord Hailsham found it
necessary to recommend “a correct but concise summary of the evidence and arguments on both sides”
and observed that a “direction is seldom improved and may be considerably damaged by copious
recitations from the total content of a judge’s note book.” R v. Lawrence, [1982] A.C. 510, 519 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Eng.).
88.
WILLIAMS, supra note 85, at 304; see also DEVLIN, supra note 82, at 117 (“[I]t is obvious that
they [the jury] are likely to be very much influenced by his [the judge’s] opinions on the facts and the
way in which he presents them . . . .”); id. at 119 (discussing proposals that judges should be forbidden
to comment on the evidence: “I doubt if this would achieve what the proposers want unless the judge
was prohibited altogether from dealing with the evidence, for the mode of its presentation to the jury is
likely to influence them just as much as any express comment.”); 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 455 (1883) (“The mere effort to see what is essential to a
story, in what order the important events happened, and in what relation they stand to each other must
of necessity point to a conclusion. The act of stating for the jury the questions which they have to
answer and of stating the evidence bearing on those questions and showing in what respects it is
important generally goes a considerable way towards suggesting an answer to them, and if a judge does
not do as much as this he does almost nothing.”).
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“misdirection of fact” was a ground of appeal, its definition was vague. 89
The way in which the judge presented the defense was a special target on
appeal. Even in presenting the defense, however, the trial judge was
allowed a great deal of discretion.90
As the practice of comment on evidence became rarer, the summing up
became more salient. In the 1960s, Lord Devlin declared: “The summingup is a vital part of the jury trial.”91
D. Establishment of Trial Courts and Courts of Appeal
with Separate Personnel
Although England established an appellate court with separate
personnel from the trial courts in the Judicature Acts of 1873-1875,92 the
prestige and powers of the trial bench were not greatly affected.
In consolidating the old courts into one Supreme Court of Judicature,93
the 1873 Act divided the English judiciary into two permanent divisions:
one called the High Court of Justice with mostly original jurisdiction, the
other the Court of Appeal.94 The House of Lords remained the court of final
appeal, but its judicial functions were transferred to a judicial committee.95
In a break with previous practice, Parliament determined that the ordinary
judges of the Court of Appeal should be separate from the ordinary trial
judges.96
There were two main reasons for having separate personnel in the
Court of Appeal.97 First, and most important, was the goal of speeding up

89.
Lord Devlin defined it as “anything which causes an appellate tribunal to think that the
presentation of the facts was seriously unbalanced.” DEVLIN, supra note 82, at 117.
90.
In a famous murder case in 1952, the judge’s summation of the prosecution’s case took up four
or five pages in the transcript of the short hand note, but he devoted only one sentence to the defense,
that the defendant denied the facts alleged against him. WILLIAMS, supra note 85, at 304 (describing the
trial of Craig and Bentley). The Court of Appeal affirmed. Id.; see also id. at 304–05 n.69 (observing
that the Court of Appeal had not been consistent in its treatment of the trial judge’s summing up of the
defense).
91.
DEVLIN, supra note 82, at 116.
92.
Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66; Supreme Court of Judicature Act,
1875, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77.
93.
36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, § 3 (1873).
94.
Id. § 4.
95.
A statute of 2005 replaced the appeal committee of the House of Lords with a Supreme Court.
Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, 53 Eliz. 2, c. 4. The Supreme Court began operation in 2009.
96.
The Court of Appeal consisted of various ex officio members and five ordinary members. Of
the ex officio members, only the Master of the Rolls usually sat. R.J. WALKER & M.G. WALKER, THE
ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 91 (1967). The court usually sits in divisions of three judges.
97.
I have not found discussion of any reasons in the existing secondary literature.
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the administration of justice.98 English courts in the nineteenth century
were under increasing pressure because of “a new class of business”:
complicated litigation concerning railways and other joint stock
companies.99 In the years leading up to the Judicature Acts, there were
many complaints about the sluggishness and confusion of the system of
post-verdict review and appeals.100 The First Report of the English
Judicature Commission of 1869 and speakers in the Parliamentary debates
in the 1870s emphasized the importance of an appellate court that sat
continuously and so was able to decide cases faster.101 If trial judges were
also to sit as appellate judges, as they did before the Acts, appellate court
sittings would be interrupted while judges presided over trials. A separate,
dedicated personnel was needed to handle appeals quickly.
A second reason for separate personnel was doubt about whether an
appeal could be efficacious if judges of the appellate court were the same
as judges of the first instance. The principle was becoming established in
English law that a judge should not hear an appeal if he had decided the
case below. A different judge would be less attached to the result below
and more likely to correct error. As discussed previously, by the midnineteenth century the court of Exchequer Chamber had adopted this
principle.102 The principle appeared in the Act of 1875, prohibiting a judge
of the Court of Appeal from hearing an appeal from any judgment or order
which he had made or was made by any division of the High Court of
which he was currently a member.103 This concern to prevent judges from
hearing appeals in cases they had decided below made it more desirable to
separate trial from appellate personnel in order to maintain a speedy,
efficient system. Having to constitute an appellate court by excluding

98.
The members of the English Judicature Commission viewed it as their charge to make
recommendations “to provide for the more speedy, economical and satisfactory dispatch of the judicial
business.” First Report of the English Judicature Commission, supra note 43, at 254-55.
99.
Id. at 258-59.
100.
See id. at 281–88; see also 214 PARL DEB., HL (3d ser.) (1873) 349-56 (statement of the Lord
Chancellor [Roundell Palmer, Lord Selborne] introducing the bill that became the Judicature Act of
1873); 216 PARL DEB., HC (3d ser.) (1873) 640-55 (statement of Mr. Charley); id. at 664 (statement of
Mr. Osborne Morgan); id. at 673-75 (statement of Mr. James); id. at 681-83 (statement of the Solicitor
General, William Vernon Harcourt); 216 PARL DEB., HC (3d ser.) (1873) 861 (statement of Mr.
Amphlett); 217 PARL DEB., HL (3d ser.) (1873) 886-87 (July 24, 1873) (statement of Lord Hatherly).
101.
See First Report of the Judicature Commission, supra note 44, at 283 (arguing that the existing
system, in which judges had too little time to hear appeals because of the pressing demands of presiding
over trials and other responsibilities, was a “very serious” inconvenience); see also 216 PARL DEB., HC
(3d ser.) (1873) 655 (statements of Mr. Charley and Mr. Amphlett); id. at 881 (statement of Mr.
Williams) (“Now, the success of the new scheme was absolutely dependent upon having a speedy and
economical appeal to a tribunal constantly at hand and continuously sitting.”).
102.
See supra text accompanying note 45.
103.
Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77, § 4. The latter situation could
arise if the ex officio members of the Court of Appeal heard appeals, which normally they did not,
except for the Master of the Rolls.
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particular members for certain cases was an administrative nuisance and
delayed appeals.104 In addition, the practice of trial judges reviewing each
other’s decisions could lead to retaliation for reversals or cooperation in
upholding decisions that would hinder proper correction of error.105
Despite the creation of an appellate court with largely separate
personnel from the trial court, there was no great difference of prestige
between ordinary appellate and trial judges and no difference at all in
salary. The salary of the ordinary judges of the Court of Appeal (styled
Lords Justices of Appeal) was £5,000 apiece, exactly the same as the
salaries of the ordinary judges of the trial courts (styled Judges of the High
Court).106 Parliament had set the salary of £5,000 for the ordinary (puisne)
common law judges in 1832,107 and the Judicature Acts simply continued it
for both trial and appellate judges. This remained the salary for the two sets
of judges until 1954, when Parliament raised them equally to £8,000.108
Both types of judges continue to enjoy similar—and considerable—
dignitary distinctions. An appointment as a judge of the High Court brings
with it a knighthood.109 Both sets of judges are referred to by the same title
on the bench: “My Lord” or “My Lady.”110
Gradually, appellate judges came to be more differentiated from trial
judges, but the differences have not been great. For many years, a sort of
fiction was maintained that there was hardly any distinction between

104.
The First Report of the Judicature Commission complained of this problem in the court of
Exchequer Chamber. First Report of the Judicature Commission, supra note 44, at 283.
105.
See id. (expressing concern that trial judges who also sat as appellate judges might engage in
retaliatory behavior: “[A]s the Judges of Appeal are not appointed or selected specially to act as such
Judges, and the Judges who have been overruled to-day may to-morrow themselves sit in appeal from
some decision of the Judges who have taken part in overruling them, [the situation] is eminently
unsatisfactory.”).
106.
Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, § 13. In 1873, one MP expressed
concern that, after paying necessary expenses for staff and traveling circuit, the judges of the High
Court would receive only £4,500. In his view, “it was not likely that the services of the best men of the
Bar could be obtained for that low sum.” 216 PARL DEB., HC (3d ser.) (1873) 1561 (statement of Mr.
Henley). Lord Carnarvon agreed. “It must not be forgotten that parsimony in the matter of salaries paid
to Judges meant a lowering of the whole judicial standard; because it was not to be expected that men of
the highest character and legal ability would accept laborious duties with a niggardly scale of payment
attached thereto.” 217 PARL DEB., HL (3d ser.) (1873) 883 (statement of Lord Carvarvon).
107.
2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 116 (1832).
108.
Judges’ Remuneration Act, 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 27 (raising the judges’ salaries to £8,000).
The Judges’ Remuneration Act, 1965, c. 61 further raised the judges’ salaries to £10,000. The 1965 Act
allowed the pay of superior judges to be raised in the future by Order in Council, subject to the approval
of both Houses of Parliament. Id. The Administration of Justice Act of 1973 repealed the Judges’
Remuneration Act and declared that judges’ salaries would be set by the Minister of Civil Service or by
the Lord Chancellor. Administration of Justice Act, 1973, c. 15, § 9.
109.
By convention, there is a minor distinction in dignity between the Lords Justices of Appeal and
the Justices of the High Court: The former are made members of the Privy Council, while the latter are
not. The Lords Justices of Appeal are therefore entitled to the honorific “The Right Honorable.”
110.
PENNY DARBYSHIRE, SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE WORKING LIVES OF JUDGES (2011).
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appellate and trial judges. In 1933, a leading legal commentator asserted
that High Court judges, already enjoying great prestige, did not look for
promotion to the Court of Appeal, and the lack of difference in salary
seemed to support that view.111 However, the difference between the top
salaries at the bar and the static judicial salary of £5,000, first established in
1832, continued to increase. In 1959, a prominent judge proclaimed in the
House of Lords that the possibility of promotion from the High Court to the
Court of Appeals was an inducement—and a necessary one—to service as
a judge.112 A government report presented to Parliament in 1974 argued
that, although the salaries of Lords Justices of Appeal and High Court
Judges had always been the same, a difference was justified.113
“[E]xceptional intellectual qualities are called for in a Lord Justice of
Appeal, and appointment to the Court of Appeal from the High Court
Bench is regarded as a promotion.”114 In recognition of the promotion, the
report recommended a higher salary for appellate judges. The report,
however, cautioned that the difference should not be large because of the
inconvenience of the High Court judges’ circuit work.115 For 2015, the
salary of the Lord Justices of Appeal is £202,668, and the salary of the
judges of the High Court is £177,988.116
Judges of the trial court have been appointed from barristers of
considerable experience and high professional reputation,117 although this

111.
“It is a fair thing to say that when a man is appointed to the Supreme Court [the High Court] he
does not look for promotion, but takes his job—with its high social status, its knighthood, its £5,000 a
year, and its rather large quantum of leisure—as something final: an apex, not a ladder.” R.C.K.
ENSOR, COURTS & JUDGES IN FRANCE, GERMANY, AND ENGLAND 5 (1933).
112.
220 PARL DEB., HL (5th ser.) (1959) 406 (statement of Lord Silkin) (“[I]n many cases,
members of the Bar make a great sacrifice in becoming High Court Judges, and one of the
inducements—and I think we ought to hold out inducements to them—is the opportunity which may
arise of their becoming members of the Court of Appeal and Members of your Lordships’ House. . . .
We have all known cases of barristers whose earnings have been £30,000 or £40,000 a year who have
made the sacrifice and become Judges at £5,000 a year, as the salary now is.”).
113.
REVIEW BODY ON TOP SALARIES, REPORT NO. 6: REPORT ON TOP SALARIES, 1974-75, Cmnd.
5846, at 93 (U.K.).
114.
Id. at 93; see also SHIMON SHETREET, JUDGES ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF THE APPOINTMENT AND
ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE ENGLISH JUDICIARY 80 (1976).
115.
SHETREET, supra note 114, at 80.
116.
See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, Ministry of Justice Judicial Salaries from 1 April 2015,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/419123/judicial-salaries1-april-2015.pdf (last visited May 13, 2016).
117.
The Act of 1873 required that appointees to the High Court be barristers of not less than ten
years’ standing. Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, § 8. In 1959, Lord
Goddard, former Chief Justice of England, told the U.S. National Conference on Judicial Selection and
Court Administration that it would be “most unusual” for anyone of fewer than 20 to 25 years standing
at the bar to be appointed a High Court judge. Lord Goddard [Rayner Goddard], Politics and the British
Bench, 43 J. AM. JUD. SOC’Y 124, 125 (1959). Furthermore, such judges were usually chosen from
among Queen’s Counsel, the senior rank at the bar whose members were “practically entirely engaged
in the conduct of cases in court . . . .” Id.
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tradition may be changing. Since 2006, a fifteen-member Judicial
Appointments Commission recommends candidates for appointment as
High Court and Court of Appeal judges.118 Tenure for judges of the High
Court and Court of Appeal is, as it has been for common law judges since
1761,119 for life during good behavior.120
A practice grew up, and endures to this day, of appointing members of
the appellate court solely from judges of the trial court,121 and usually those
of considerable experience. Members of the bar therefore cannot leap over
the trial court directly to the appellate court and establish an immediate
superiority. Commentators have observed that this practice has costs; some
prominent members of the bar would leave practice to become appellate
judges, but refuse to leave it to become trial judges.122 Nevertheless, the
advantages of the system of promotion are thought to outweigh the costs.
Trial judges are well respected, and appellate judges are deeply familiar
with presiding over trials and can fashion rules accordingly.
Despite the separation of trial judges from appellate judges, the English
judiciary has continued its tradition of having a respected trial bench
comparable in quality to the appellate bench.

118.
The Judicial Appointments Commission was created by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, c.
4, § 61. The act specifies that “[s]election must be solely on merit,” and that “[a] person must not be
selected unless the selecting body is satisfied that he is of good character.” Id. § 63. The Commission
“must have regard to the need to encourage diversity in the range of persons available for selection for
appointments.” Id. § 64. The Commission describes its application and selection process at JUDICIAL
APPOINTMENTS COMMISSION, Application and Selection, https://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/application-andselection (last visited May 13, 2016). In 2015, the Judicial Appointments Commission announced a
pilot program to train “women, those from a black, Asian or minority ethnic background and those
‘from less advantaged social or educational backgrounds’” to prepare for selection as deputy high court
judges. Owen Bowcott, High Court to Go on Recruitment Drive for “Non-traditional” Judges, THE
GUARDIAN, Apr. 8, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/apr/08/high-court-recruitment-drivernon-traditional-judges. Deputy high court judges are expected to apply to become full-time high court
judges. Id. Lady Justice Hallett, who announced the program, stated that candidates for deputy high
court judge may have “little or no experience of attending or appearing in the high court—or any court
for that matter.” Id.
119.
Commissions and Salaries of Judges Act, 1760, 1 Geo. 3, c. 23.
120.
Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, § 9 (“life”); Supreme Court of
Judicature Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., c. 77, § 5 (“good behaviour”). Judges of the Court of Appeal and
the High Court may be removed only with the approval of both Houses of Parliament. Id.
121.
See
COURTS
AND
TRIBUNALS
JUDICIARY,
Court
of
Appeal
Judges,
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/who-are-the-judiciary/judicial-roles/judges/coajudges/ (last visited May 13, 2016) (“[T]he Lords Justices of Appeal . . . are selected from the ranks of
the High Court Judges.”); HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, THIRD REPORT JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS
PROCEDURES, 1995-6, H.C. 52 (“Lords Justices of Appeal, who sit in the Appeal Courts, are invariably
appointed on promotion from the ranks of High Court Judges.”). Since 1946, the judges of the Court of
Appeal have been appointed exclusively from serving judges of the High Court, and there were few
exceptions before then. GAVIN DREWRY, LOUIS BLOM-COOPER & CHARLES BLAKE, THE COURT OF
APPEAL 111 (2007).
122.
DREWRY ET AL., supra note 121.
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E. The Special Situation of Criminal Appeals
and Comment on Evidence
The common law systems were especially slow to develop appeals in
criminal cases.123 In England, the procedure of ordering a new trial, so
freely used to correct jury and other error in civil cases, was not available
in criminal cases. There was no way to correct an improper verdict of
acquittal, if a jury insisted on it, because of the double jeopardy rule.124 If
an improper conviction occurred, the trial judge could request executive
clemency, and judicial requests were rarely denied.125 Until the twentieth
century, the only way to correct an erroneous conviction within the court
system was by reservation of the trial judge, and then only for errors of
law. The trial judge reserved a point to be decided by all the judges
together, an informal process that at first did not result in a formal
judgment.126 The process became more regular, and in 1848 was formalized
in a statute creating the Court for Crown Cases Reserved.127 Still, that court
could only be invoked on reservation by the trial judge of a point of law,
and was little-used.128
Judges strongly resisted routine appeals in criminal cases. The judges’
reasons included concerns that there were not enough judges to staff a court
of criminal appeals, and that a right of appeal by the defense should be
matched by a corresponding right of the prosecution.129 The judges’ deepest
worry, and that of other opponents of criminal appeals, was that appeals in
criminal cases would cause delay and detract from the swiftness of
punishment necessary to deterrence. Deterrence through swift and severe
punishment was all the more important because England long lacked an
effective police force.130 As Lord Hatherley, Lord Chancellor, put it in a
debate in the House of Lords in 1870:

All who have gone into the subject of punishment are agreed
that to be effectual it should be speedy as well as certain, and
nothing produces a greater effect on a criminal’s mind than to

123.
See LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 702-05.
124.
Id. at 443-44.
125.
Id. at 626-28.
126.
James Oldham, Informal Lawmaking in England by the Twelve Judges in the Late Eighteenth
and Early Nineteenth Centuries, 29 LAW & HIST. REV. 181, 191-99 (2011); Randall McGowen, Forgery
and the Twelve Judges in Eighteenth-Century England, 29 LAW & HIST. REV. 221, 255-56 (2011).
127.
Phil Handler, The Court for Crown Cases Reserved, 1848-1908, 29 LAW & HIST. REV. 259,
261-64 (2011); Benjamin L. Berger, Criminal Appeals as Jury Control: An Anglo-Canadian
Perspective on the Rise of Criminal Appeals, 10 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (2005).
128.
Berger, supra note 127, at 12.
129.
ROSEMARY PATTENDEN, ENGLISH CRIMINAL APPEALS 1844–1994, at 23 (1996).
130.
Id.
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find that, as sometimes happens, only a few days intervene
between the commission of the crime and the trial, and only
about a week between the latter and the execution. The terror
caused by this speedy determination is one of the most
effective means of impressing the criminal class. Now, this
would be fatally interfered with if those desirous of
interfering with a sentence had to apply to a tribunal for the
purpose of re-hearing the case.131
After two notable miscarriages of justice in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, public opinion strengthened in favor of a regular
system of appeal to correct error.132 In 1907, Parliament created the Court
of Criminal Appeal.133
The Court of Criminal Appeal was highly unusual for the time because
it was staffed with High Court judges from the King’s Bench division.134 In
other words, the appellate court was staffed with the very judges who
ordinarily heard criminal cases in the first instance. This was the model that
Parliament had rejected for civil appeals in the Judicature Acts, as
discussed above. It appears that judges, although they lost the fight to
prevent a criminal court of appeal, won an appellate bench that likely
would be more deferential to trial judges. Not until 1966 was the Court of
Criminal Appeal made part of the Court of Appeal, and mainly staffed with
a separate personnel of appellate judges, but even then, trial judges could
and did regularly sit on the Court of Criminal Appeal.135
Through the 1960s, trial judges were permitted wide latitude in making
comments on evidence to the jury. Beginning in the 1990s, the Court of
Criminal Appeal issued a series of decisions somewhat limiting the trial
court’s discretion in commenting, although the power remains.136
Currently in England, judicial summing up is expected and may be a
ground for reversal if omitted,137 particularly in a complicated case.138 The
judge must describe the defense,139 but may point out inconsistencies in the
defense case.140 The most recent edition of the Bench Book from the

131.
200 PARL. DEB., H.L. (3d ser.) (1870) 1158.
132.
PATTENDEN, supra note 129, at 27-30.
133.
Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23.
134.
PATTENDEN, supra note 129, at 34.
135.
Criminal Appeal Act, 1966; D. A. Thomas, The Criminal Appeal Act 1966, 30 M.L.R. 64, 6465 (1967).
136.
See, e.g., R v. Marr, (1990) 90 Crim. App. 154, 156; R v. Curtin, [1996] Crim LR 831, 832.
137.
R v. Berrada, (1990) 91 Crim. App. 131, 136; R v. Amado-Taylor, (2000) 2 Crim. App. 189.
138.
R v. Attfield, (1961) 45 Crim. App. 309, 313.
139.
Marr, 90 Crim. App. at 156.
140.
R v. Evans, (1990) 91 Crim. App. 173, 173.
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Judicial Studies Board leaves large discretion to the trial judge, but
cautions against simply summarizing the testimony in the order it was
given at trial.141 English judges now appear regularly to use flow charts of
necessary jury decisions—called decision trails or “routes-to-verdict”—to
assist the jury in reaching a verdict.142
English trial judges retain the power to comment overtly on the
evidence, but exercise it less frequently than before.143 A case often cited in
modern sources for the judicial power to comment dates from 1917, in
which the trial judge described the defendant’s story as “a remarkable
one.”144 Commentators in the 1960s asserted a strong judicial power to
comment on evidence, though they suggested that it was not always
used.145 In 1996, an appellate judge declared: “We do not doubt that the
degree of adverse comment allowed today is substantially less than it was
50 years ago.”146 As justification for the power to comment, judges and
commentators emphasized, and continue to emphasize, the greater
experience of the judge relative to lay jurors, and the tendency of jurors to
be confused by the arguments of counsel.147

141.
JUDICIAL STUDIES BOARD, supra note 81, at 4 (“How to organise a summary of the evidence is
a matter for individual judgement based upon the nature of the evidence and the issues in the case.
Almost never will it be helpful or appropriate simply to summarise each witness in turn.”). The manual
further states: “Brevity is a virtue, provided that essential matters are not thereby omitted. Essential
matters are those which bear directly on the issues the jury has to determine. The judge is not obliged to
repeat every byway taken by the evidence, but is entitled to assess what is important and what is
peripheral.” Id. at 5. The Bench Book describes five different ways that evidence may be organized in
the summing up. Id.
142.
Paul Marcus, Judges Talking to Jurors in Criminal Cases: Why U.S. Judges Do It So
Differently from Just About Everyone Else, 30 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 54-55 & n.123 (2013).
143.
See Marcus, supra note 142, at 24 n.72.
144.
R v. O’Donnell, (1917) 12 Crim. App. 219, 221.
145.
WILLIAMS, supra note 85, at 303-04 & n.67; DEVLIN, supra note 82, at 118 (“Some judges . . .
will indicate an opinion on some of the issues or on the value of some pieces of evidence: unless it be in
favour of the defence in a criminal trial it would be exceptional for the judge to put forward an opinion
on the case as a whole. Nevertheless a judge is permitted to express his opinion freely and, if he wishes,
strongly. The only limitation placed on him is that he must not put any point unfairly and must make it
clear to the jury, either expressly or by implication, that on the issues of fact which are left to them they
are free to give his opinion what weight they choose.”); WILLIAM R. CORNISH, THE JURY 123 (1968)
(“The judge is free to comment as he likes on the strength of the case made out by either side
. . . . The judge’s discretion in commenting upon the evidence is limited only in a minor degree.”).
146.
R v. Wood, (1996) 1 Crim. App. 207 (Staughton L.J.).
147.
R v. Cohen, (1990) 2 Crim. App. 197, 208; TAYLOR, supra note 83, at 28; Wolchover, supra
note 70, at 788. One commentator, however, has argued that juries are sufficiently sophisticated, and
counsel sufficiently clear and business-like, that judicial comment and summing up are unnecessary and
potentially dangerous. Wolchover, supra note 70, at 788–92.
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IV. FEDERAL COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Federal Courts to the Late Nineteenth Century
1. Organization
In 1789, the first Congress chose a structure for the federal courts
largely resembling that of the English circuit system. The highest judges in
the land, the justices of the Supreme Court, were to ride circuit and to sit
regularly as trial judges.
In the Judiciary Act of 1789,148 Congress created two types of federal
trial courts: the district courts and the circuit courts. A separate federal
district court was created for each state which had ratified the Constitution,
and one district judge was authorized for each.149 Except for its grant of
admiralty jurisdiction, the district court was conceived as “a very inferior
court indeed.”150 The federal circuit courts, in contrast, were to have
broader jurisdiction, including some appeals from the district court.
Congress grouped the districts into three circuits: the Eastern, the Middle,
and the Southern.151 Circuit courts were to sit twice a year in each district
of the circuit. Each sitting of the circuit courts was to consist of two justices
of the Supreme Court and the local district judge.152 The federal Supreme
Court consisted of the Chief Justice and five associate justices.153 Given the
composition of the circuit courts, the vast extent of the circuits, and the
poor conditions of travel in the eighteenth century, the justices of the
Supreme Court necessarily spent much of their time on circuit.154
These arrangements were the result of extensive political
compromise.155 Many of the political battles and positions that formed
around the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 endured into the twentieth
century. The Federalists wanted a strong federal judiciary, including lower
courts, not beholden to the states but supporting national power and
uniform legal rules throughout the country. Such a system, they believed,
was conducive to commercial development; state courts and state

148.
1 Stat. 73.
149.
Id. § 2.
150.
1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 473 (1971).
151.
Judiciary Act of 1789 § 4.
152.
Id.
153.
Id. § 1.
154.
GOEBEL, supra note 150, at 553-54.
155.
For discussion of these battles and compromises, see 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 5, 10–17 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1992);
Anthony J. Bellia & Bradford R. Clark, The Original Source of the Cause of Action in Federal Courts:
The Example of the Alien Tort Statute, 101 VA. L. REV. 609, 638–39 (2015).
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legislatures (who at that time selected judges in most states) had proven
eager to support debtors at the expense of creditors.156 The Anti-Federalists
thought lower federal courts unnecessary and wanted to limit their
jurisdiction and to tie them to the states, and local interests and rules, as
much as possible.
The Federalists succeeded in establishing federal trial courts, over the
objections of the Anti-Federalists, but they paid a price. Federal question
jurisdiction was largely left to the state courts. Federal district judges were
tied to the states; they were required to be residents of their districts,
coterminous with states.157 The Judiciary Act of 1789,158 and more
specifically the Process Acts of 1789159 and 1792,160 required the federal
courts to follow the “forms of writs and executions” and the “forms and
modes of proceeding” of the state in which each court sat, if there was no
federal statute on the subject.161 The required conformity was “static,”
because it required conformity to state forms of proceeding as they existed
in 1792.162 Because Supreme Court justices, when they held circuit courts,
could not be expected to know the details of state practice, the district
judge was there to help them.163
Supreme Court justices were kept busy running around the country on
circuit. Members of both parties saw advantages in this system. There were
many reasons for Congress’s attraction to the circuit system. 164 First was
the desire to save money by making members of the federal bench do
double duty as trial and appellate judges. As in England, the effect was to
slow down the administration of justice.165 Second, travelling around the
country hearing trials would expose federal justices to state laws and
practice, and keep them directly in contact with juries. Third, being visited
regularly by the highest judges of the federal bench would hopefully

156.
Henry Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 497–99
(1928); John Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3,
25 (1948).
157.
Judiciary Act of 1789 §3.
158.
Id. §§ 14, 34.
159.
Act of Sept. 29, 1789, c. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93 (repealed 1792).
160.
Act of May 8, 1792, c. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275 (repealed 1872).
161.
Id. The Process Acts have not been much noticed by historians of the federal courts, until
recently. For an extensive discussion of the relevant provisions of the Judiciary Act and the Process
Acts, see Bellia & Clark, supra note 155, at 627–55. See also 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
155, at 112–13; GOEBEL, supra note 150, at 509–10.
162.
See Bellia & Clark, supra note 155, at 655.
163.
Id.
164.
See Joshua Glick, On the Road: The Supreme Court and the History of Circuit Riding, 24
CARDOZO L. REV. 1753, 1757-61 (2003).
165.
RUSSELL R. WHEELER & CYNTHIA HARRISON, CREATING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 7–8
(3d ed. 2005).
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impress citizens favorably toward the national government.166 Fourth, if
trials were conducted by such a prestigious bench, the judgments of the
federal courts would likely be more respected and authoritative. This was
especially important in criminal cases, in which there was no appeal. Fifth,
there was the advantage that Matthew Hale described for the English circuit
system: maintaining uniformity of legal rules throughout the country.
For justices, the hardships of riding circuit far outweighed these
advantages. The justices complained bitterly about the duty from the
beginning. The federal circuits required travel over vast distances: 1,900
miles for the Southern Circuit, the longest.167 Justices had to cope with
overturned coaches, runaway horses and vehicle crashes, near drownings in
flooding rivers, frozen river crossings, 168 and “rascally” inns.169 Justice
James Iredell was so appalled that his colleagues assigned him to ride the
Southern Circuit in perpetuity that by his own account he was struck
speechless.170 He recovered enough to address a written remonstrance to his
brethren: “I will venture to say no Judge can conscientiously undertake to
ride the Southern Circuit constantly, and perform the other parts of his
duty.”171 The indignant Iredell, with the help of his brother-in-law Senator
Samuel Johnston, persuaded Congress in 1792 to require the justices to
rotate circuits.172 Several distinguished lawyers declined or resigned
appointments to the Court because of the rigors of circuit riding.173
The justices reported another problem with circuit riding, one familiar
from the English debates in the mid-nineteenth century: the administrative
difficulties caused by the desire to prevent a judge from hearing an appeal
of a case he had decided below. The Judiciary Act of 1789 specified that
district judges, when they sat on circuit courts, should not vote on appeals
from cases they had decided below.174 There was, however, no similar
prohibition on Supreme Court justices hearing appeals of cases they had

166.
Justices used their charges to grand juries to teach citizens about the federal government and
their duties in a republic. 2 The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 17891800, at 5–6 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1985); Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican
Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 127.
167.
GOEBEL, supra note 150, at 557.
168.
Id. at 569 & n.79.
169.
James E. Pfander, Judicial Compensation and the Definition of Judicial Power in the Early
Republic, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1, 23 n.120 (2008).
170.
Letter from James Iredell to John Jay et al. (Feb. 11, 1791) in 2 GRIFFITH J. MCREE, LIFE AND
CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 322 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1857) .
171.
Id. at 324.
172.
Act of Apr. 13, 1792, c. 21, 1 Stat. 252. On this act, see Pfander, supra note 169, at 28–31.
173.
GOEBEL, supra note 150, at 553–54.
174.
Judiciary Act of 1789 § 4.
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decided as circuit judges.175 The justices protested to Congress that they
sometimes were required to “correct in one capacity the errors which they
themselves may have committed in another . . . a distinction unfriendly to
impartial justice.”176 To solve this problem, the justices agreed among
themselves that they would not vote on appeals from their own decisions
except in the case of a split vote.177 Critics of the system of circuit riding
continued to raise the issue of a justice hearing an appeal from his own
decision.178
Congress initially was unsympathetic to the justices’ plight. The
justices were considered to be well-paid compared to state court judges,179
partly in order to offset the expense of riding the long circuits.180 There was
no separate appropriation to cover the justices’ travel expenses, and there
remained none during the whole period that justices traveled circuit. Failure
to reimburse travel expenses, apart from the justices’ salaries, hardly
encouraged the justices to travel circuit.
In such a large and growing country, regular circuit riding by justices
of a central court proved unworkable in any case. Congress gradually
diminished the justices’ circuit-riding responsibilities.181 Also of great
importance was the related continuing decay of the circuit court as a panel

175.
See Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention
of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1505 (describing the failure of the Act to contain this
prohibition).
176.
WHEELER & HARRISON, supra note 165 (quoting Letter from George Washington to Congress
(Nov. 7, 1792) in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS MISCELLANEOUS 51-52 (Washington, Gales & Seaton
1834)).
177.
In Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 256 n.* (1796), Justice Iredell explained the practice.
178.
In 1861, Senator John P. Hale of New Hampshire gave a floor speech criticizing circuit riding.
“I think that the Supreme Court of the United States in its very organization has a radical and fatal error,
one that we inherited from the British constitution.” Judges should not review their own decisions on
appeal, because they “look on those cases as their own children, that they are bound to take care of
when they come up to be reviewed on the bench.” CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 26–28 (1861).
Hale urged the Senate Judiciary Committee to look abroad, and to “see the judicial progress that some
of the best minds of England have been laboring for a long while to accomplish, without effecting a
great deal, though they have done something . . . .” Id. at 28.
179.
GOEBEL, supra note 150, at 568 & n.71.
180.
Pfander, supra note169, at 19–24. Pfander observes that any reduction in circuit riding was in
effect a salary increase for the justices, which helps to explain their implacable opposition to riding
circuit. Id. at 33–34.
181.
In 1793, Congress reduced from two to one the number of justices needed to hold a circuit
court. Judiciary Act of 1793, c. 22, 1 Stat. 333. In 1801, the Federalists enacted a law that established
six circuits, each with a newly created circuit court judgeship, and ended the Supreme Court justices’
circuit riding. Judiciary Act of 1801, c. 4, 2 Stat. 89. The Jeffersonian Republicans quickly repealed the
act in 1802 and substituted a new one that abolished the circuit judgeships and again required justices to
ride circuit, but retained the six circuits. Judiciary Act of 1802, c. 31, 2 Stat. 156. The Judiciary Act of
1802 assigned to each circuit the Supreme Court justice “residing within” the circuit, the distribution of
circuits to be worked out by the justices. Id. §§ 4–5. The circuit courts were to be held by the Supreme
Court justice residing within the circuit and the district judge, sitting together as a panel.
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of judges.182 Slowly over the nineteenth century, the seeming exception
became the rule. More and more, the district judges held circuit court
alone.183 Not only did this situation leave important questions to be decided
by a single judge in the first instance, it diminished the possibility of
appeal. In case of a disagreement between two judges sitting together as a
circuit court, the point of disagreement was to be stated and certified for
decision by the Supreme Court.184 If there was only one judge, no
disagreement was possible and thus no appeal on that basis.
The situation of the main federal trial court being held by a single
judge does not seem so dire to us today; that is a feature of the current
federal system. In the nineteenth century, the lack of access to appeal—
characteristic of common law systems—made the situation especially
dangerous. There was no intermediate court of appeal in the federal system
until the end of the nineteenth century. Any appeals from the circuit courts
had to go to the Supreme Court, with its limited capacity. Even more
important, many cases in the circuit court were not subject to review at all.
These included civil matters involving less than $2,000, and all criminal
cases, except if there was a division of the court.185 Federal legislators were
concerned. Executive clemency was a remedy, but some viewed it as
insufficient to cure the lack of appeal in criminal cases. In 1829, a report of
the Senate Judiciary Committee complained of the problem of a single
district judge in the circuit court hearing civil cases,186 and observed: “The

182.
Buried in the Act of 1802, in the lengthy fourth section, in the middle of a seemingly routine
paragraph on the constitution of the sixth circuit, appeared language allowing a circuit court to be held
by a district judge sitting alone. Id. § 4 (“provided, that when only one of the judges hereby directed to
hold the circuit courts, shall attend, such circuit court may be held by the judge so attending”). The
importance of the provision was perhaps not immediately evident. The provision may simply have been
intended to cover situations in which the justice for the circuit was unavoidably delayed in travel, or in
which a justice or district judge was ill, or had died and had not yet been replaced. This last scenario
occurred in the third circuit with the death of Justice William Paterson in 1806, and in 1808 litigants
challenged a judgment of the circuit court because it was held by the district judge alone. Chief Justice
John Marshall, writing for the Supreme Court, brusquely rejected the challenge based on the provision
of the Act. Pollard & Pickett v. Dwight, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 421, 429 (1808).
183.
See infra text accompanying notes 186-192. In part, this was because Congress diminished the
Supreme Court justices’ circuit travel requirements. In 1844, Congress required Supreme Court justices
to visit their circuits only once a year, although the circuits had two terms a year. Act of June 17, 1844,
c. 96, 5 Stat. 676. The growing number of states and expansion of U.S. territory, together with rising
caseloads, strained the federal court structure. Congress created new circuits and added a new Supreme
Court justice for each. In the process, new states were often left for some time outside a circuit and
without a justice, and district judges in those places necessarily exercised the full federal jurisdiction
alone.
184.
Judiciary Act of 1802, c. 31, § 6, 2 Stat. 156.
185.
S. DOC. NO. 20-50, at 5 (1829). On the lack of review of criminal cases in England, see
LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 702–05.
186.
S. DOC. NO. 20-50, supra note 185. The report explained that in situations in which a district
judge alone holds circuit court, “[h]is single opinion is decisive of the controversy in every matter of
law. If the amount exceed two thousand dollars, the party who can sustain the expense of prosecuting an
appeal, or writ of error, may indeed have his cause reviewed by the Supreme tribunal—but every suitor
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evil is more striking in criminal cases. The fiat of an individual, which
dooms the accused to imprisonment, or to death, is irresistible, irreversible.
No appeal is allowed—no writ of error provided by law; and, from the
constitution of the Court, no disagreement can arise to invoke the
protective interposition of the supreme tribunal.”187
Even Abraham Lincoln’s powerful critique of the federal court system
in his first annual message to Congress on the state of the union in 1861,188
together with the creation of circuit judges in 1869,189 failed to solve
adequately the twin problems of single judges presiding over important
cases and lack of appellate review. The new circuit judges spent a great
deal of time traveling around their large circuits.190 In 1889, the author of a
paper presented at the American Bar Association’s annual meeting
described the circuit judge: “The only thing he can do is to exercise his
jurisdiction in a few spots here and there. He wings his flight across a broad
expanse and dips down in a few favored localities.”191 The author claimed
that at that time, eight-ninths of the cases in the circuit courts were
disposed of by single judges, mostly district judges.192
Federal caseloads and backlogs continued to grow. Not only were the
population and commercial activity increasing, but after the Civil War
Congress greatly expanded federal jurisdiction. In 1875, Congress passed
two important and related statutes within two days of each other: the Civil
Rights Act193 and the Judiciary Act.194 The latter fulfilled the Federalist
dream of granting general federal question jurisdiction to the federal trial
courts. With these acts, the Republicans helped realize their goals of full
cannot sustain this expense, and to him the doom is final. In many instances, too, the counsels of an
Associate would probably have changed the result, and have rendered this appeal unnecessary; and in
those cases, where, from the smallness of the amount in controversy, the right of appeal is not allowed,
the injury resulting from the error of this single Judge, is remediless.” Id.
187.
Id.
188.
In his first annual message to Congress on the state of the union in 1861, President Lincoln—
although he had other issues to discuss—thought it important to observe that “the country generally has
outgrown our present judicial system” and to propose solutions. Message to Congress of Dec. 3, 1861,
in 5 THE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 41 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). He explained that the circuit
system as originally designed no longer functioned adequately, and that eight recently admitted states
had never had circuit courts attended by Supreme Court justices. Id. at 41-42. His recommendations
included limiting the number of Supreme Court justices, regardless of the number of circuits, and then
adding separate circuit judges. Id. at 42.
189.
Congress created nine circuit judgeships, one for each circuit. In the same act, Congress
reduced the requirement of Supreme Court justices visiting their circuits to once every two years. Act of
Apr. 10, 1869, c. 22, 16 Stat. 44. On the passage of this act, see Glick, supra note 164, at 1815-1817.
190.
ERWIN C. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 62–63 (2d ed. 2002). The circuit
judges spent time hearing appeals from the district courts in admiralty cases, appointing receivers in
equity cases, and appointing other judges to serve for district judges who were ill or incapacitated. Id.
191.
Walter B. Hill, The Federal Judicial System, 12 A.B.A. Rep. 289, 302 (1889).
192.
Id. at 304.
193.
Act of Mar. 1, 1875, c. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
194.
Act of Mar. 3, 1875, c. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
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rights of citizenship for freedmen and a robust national market with unified
legal rules. As a result, however, in the late nineteenth century the federal
courts became clogged, and appeals in particular slowed tremendously.
Appeals brought to the Supreme Court took years to decide. Decisions of
federal trial courts were often for practical purposes unreviewable.195 The
appellate docket of the Supreme Court, which was mandatory, became so
crowded that justices sometimes determined they could not travel their
circuits.196 By the 1880s, several justices refused to travel their circuits
altogether.197
There were sharply differing opinions about how to solve the problem,
echoing the earlier debates over the federal judiciary between Federalists
and Anti-Federalists. Some, particularly well-represented in the Senate,
wanted to preserve the expanded federal jurisdiction and to speed up the
administration of justice in the federal courts by creating an intermediate
court of appeals with separate personnel.198 They worried about prejudice
against corporations in state courts and the safety of capital, which they
viewed as threatened by populist enactments of state legislatures.199 Others,
with strength in the House of Representatives and the South and West,
opposed the creation of an intermediate court of appeals and wanted to
restrict federal jurisdiction instead.200 In their view, the expansion of
federal jurisdiction after the Civil War was anomalous and should be
reversed. They complained that the federal courts favored commercial
interests and were too willing to overturn state laws.201
A significant concern of advocates for an intermediate court of appeals
was the problems caused by single district judges holding circuit courts.
The lack of review, or effective review, led to a potential “judicial

195.
WHEELER & HARRISON, supra note 165, at 16.
196.
Glick, supra note 164, at 1818.
197.
Id. at 1824. Congress’s consistent failure to appropriate money for the justices’ travel expenses
on circuit remained a reason for justices to avoid the duty when they could. Some justices and other
federal judges accepted free railroad passes, presumably for this reason, although railroads were
frequent litigants in federal courts. See id. at 1814–15; 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 541–48 (1971).
198.
FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 91–92 (1928);
Daniel S. Holt, The Abolition of Federal Circuit Courts and the Course of Judicial Reform in the Early
Twentieth Century 7 (Mar. 2011) (unpublished paper) (on file with the author); Howard Gillman, How
Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States,
1875–1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511 (2002). Proponents of intermediate courts of appeals argued
that a panel of judges on appeal could take the place of a panel of judges in the first instance. George
W. McCrary, Needs of the Federal Judiciary, 13 CENT. L.J. 167 (1881) [hereinafter McCrary, Needs of
the Federal Judiciary]. The key was to prevent a decision by a single judge which was effectively
unreviewable, leading to a “judicial despotism.” George W. McCrary, Our Federal Judiciary, 2 CENT.
L.J. 551 (1875) [hereinafter McCrary, Our Federal Judiciary].
199.
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 198, at 91-92.
200.
Id. at 82–85; Holt, supra note 198; Gillman, supra note 198, at 520.
201.
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 198, at 85.

3_LERNER_JCI (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

5/19/2016 10:07 AM

The Creation of Appellate Courts

249

despotism.”202 A circuit judge, formerly a member of the House of
Representatives who had called for creation of an intermediate court of
appeals, emphasized in an article in 1881 that circuit courts had been
established on the principle that important classes of cases were to be
decided by panels of judges. He stressed the importance of deciding
questions of law, but his argument also applied to questions of fact. He
explained:
The value of discussion, and a comparison of views by judges in
conference, can hardly be overestimated. The Federal judicial
system is based upon the theory that the concurrence of two judges
in the judgment of the circuit courts in important cases is desirable;
or that in case of a difference of opinion, while the view of the
presiding judge shall prevail, the case . . . may go to the Supreme
Court.203
2. Judicial Comment: Broad Discretion
in the First Hundred Years
In the early nineteenth century, decisions of the Supreme Court gave
trial courts—which often at the time included the justices themselves—
large discretion to comment on facts to the jury. The Court declared that it
would not even review such questions on writ of error, virtually the only
form of appeal allowed. Justice Joseph Story authored many of the early
opinions.204 Story did urge trial judges to take care to separate the law from
the facts, and to make sure that the jury understood that the latter were for
them to decide.205 Otherwise, the Supreme Court left the matter to the trial
judges’ discretion.
In several of the cases, Story expressed impatience with the growing
practice of counsel to put the whole charge of the trial court to the jury on
the record, and to object to every part of it.206 The Court announced its
“decided disapprobation” of the practice, and declared it to be

202.
McCrary, Our Federal Judiciary, supra note 198, at 551.
203.
McCrary, Needs of the Federal Judiciary, supra note 198, at 169.
204.
See, e.g., McLanahan v. Universal Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 170, 182 (1828) (Story, J.) (“It is,
doubtless, within the province of a Court, in the exercise of its discretion, to sum up the facts in the case
to the jury, and submit them, with the inferences of law deducible therefrom, to the free judgment of the
jury.”); Carver v. Jackson ex rel. Astor, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 1, 4 (1830) (Story, J.); Magniac v. Thomson, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 348, 390 (1833) (Story, J.); see also Tracy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 80, 95–96
(1836) (McLean, J.); Games v. Stiles ex rel. Dunn, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 322, 327 (1840) (McLean, J.).
205.
McLanahan, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 182 (reversing a judgment in which the trial court instructed
the jury “‘that upon the whole evidence in the case’ the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover, and the
verdict of the jury ‘ought to be for the defendants’”).
206.
Carver, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 4; Magniac, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 390.
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“unauthorized” and “extremely inconvenient both to the inferior and to the
appellate court.”207 The reason was that the trial judge’s charge often
included observations on matters of fact. Story firmly declared, “With the
charge of the court to the jury, upon mere matters of fact, and with its
commentaries upon the weight of the evidence, this court has nothing to
do.”208 If the trial court gave a misdirection on a matter of law, that was
different, and could properly be pointed out and objected to.209 The
Supreme Court, however, would not trammel the trial court’s commentary
on matters of fact, so long as the issue was left to the jury.210 Story
suggested that the possibility of such comments being reviewed was greater
in England, because of the practice there of reviewing a motion for a new
trial before the full court.211 In the federal courts, in contrast, motions for
new trial were addressed to the trial court only and could not be reviewed
by the Supreme Court on writ of error.212
The Supreme Court repeatedly declared, through the late nineteenth
century, that it would not review a trial judge’s comments on fact.213 The
most ringing statement of this rule came in 1886, probably inspired by the
growing gulf in practice between the state and federal courts:
In the courts of the United States, as in those of England, from
which our practice was derived, the judge, in submitting a case to
the jury, may, at his discretion, whenever he thinks it necessary to
assist them in arriving at a just conclusion, comment upon the
evidence, call their attention to parts of it which he thinks

207.
Carver, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 4; accord Magniac, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 390.
208.
Carver, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 4 (“Observations of that nature are understood to be addressed to
the jury, merely for their consideration, as the ultimate judges of matters of fact; and are entitled to no
more weight or importance, than the jury in the exercise of their own judgment choose to give them.
They neither are, nor are they understood to be, binding upon them, as the true and conclusive
exposition of the evidence.”); accord Magniac, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 390.
209.
Carver, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 4.
210.
Chief Justice Taney described a limited exception in a case in 1857: A trial judge could not
charge a jury “upon a supposed or conjectural state of facts, of which no evidence has been offered.”
United States v. Breitling, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 252, 254–55 (1857). In that case, the trial court, at the
request of defendant’s counsel, charged the jury that they should find for the defendant if, at the time
defendant signed a bond, it was understood that other persons would sign the bond as obligors, but they
did not. The Supreme Court found there was no evidence that other persons were supposed to sign the
bond. Id. at 253, 255. Such a charge, the Court stated, “does not aid them [the jurors] in coming to
correct conclusions, but its tendency is to embarrass and mislead them. It may induce them to indulge in
conjectures, instead of weighing the testimony.” Id. at 255. See also Michigan Ins. Bank v. Eldred, 76
U.S. (9 Wall.) 544, 553–54 (1869) (following Breitling). For several further examples of federal judges
commenting on evidence, see Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 30, at 646 n.235, 647 n.243.
211.
McLanahan, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 189-91.
212.
Indianapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Horst, 93 U.S. 291, 301 (1876) (citing cases).
213.
See, e.g., Transp. Line v. Hope, 95 U.S. 297, 302 (1877) (“An expression of opinion simply by
a judge upon a question of fact is not a ground of error.”) (citing New York cases); Vicksburg & M.R.
Co. v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 545, 553-54 (1886).
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important, and express his opinion upon the facts; and the
expression of such an opinion, when no rule of law is incorrectly
stated, and all matters of fact are ultimately submitted to the
determination of the jury, cannot be reviewed on writ of error.214
3. The Effects of Differing State Practices
During the course of the nineteenth century, the practice of judicial
comment on evidence in federal and state courts increasingly diverged. As
I and other scholars have described, many states limited or prohibited the
trial judge’s power to comment.215 During the first half of the nineteenth
century, the Supreme Court did not mention different state practices with
respect to summing up or comment on evidence. The Court cited English
cases—particularly those of Lord Mansfield—and New York cases.216 New
York had a robust practice of judicial comment on evidence.
After mid-century, the Court began to take more notice of differences.
In the 1851 case Mitchell v. Harmony, Chief Justice Roger Taney, a
Jacksonian Democrat when he went on the Court and a supporter of states’
rights, observed that, in some of the states, judges did not sum up or
comment on evidence.217 Most of the states at the time continued to follow
“the usages of the English courts of justice,” in which the judge always
summed up the evidence and could comment on it. He refused to declare
which practice was preferable, but recommended that federal courts follow
the practice of the state in which they sat.218 He cited Story’s opinions, and
the Court upheld the trial judge’s comments in the case, which were made
when the circuit court was sitting in New York.219
The question of differing state court practices grew more intense after
1872, with the passage of the federal Conformity Act.220 As explained
previously, the Process Act of 1792 required federal trial courts to follow
the forms and modes of proceeding of the state in which they sat, as the

214.
Vicksburg, 118 U.S. at 553. In Vicksburg, the federal Circuit Court in Georgia commented on
evidence in a manner unfavorable to the defendant, a railroad in a personal injury case. See also United
States v. Philadelphia & R.R. Co., 123 U.S. 113, 114 (1887) (paraphrasing and citing Vicksburg);
Rucker v. Wheeler, 127 U.S. 85, 93 (1888) (quoting Vicksburg); Lovejoy v. United States, 128 U.S.
171, 173 (1888) (citing Rucker); California Ins. Co. v. Union Compress Co., 133 U.S. 387, 417 (1890);
Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148, 155 (1891).
215.
See supra notes 28-30.
216.
See, e.g., McLanahan, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 189-91 (citing opinions by Mansfield and James
Kent).
217.
Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 130-31 (1851).
218.
Id. at 131.
219.
Id. at 130 (“This mode of charging the jury has always prevailed in the State of New York, and
has been followed in the Circuit Court ever since the adoption of the Constitution.”).
220.
Act of June 1, 1872, c. 255, 17 Stat. 196.

33_LERNER_JCI (DO NOT DELETE)

252

The Journal of the Legal Profession

5/19/2016 10:07 AM

[Vol. 40:2

practices existed in 1792. The federal courts adhered to traditional common
law pleadings and practice. With the advent in many states of codes of civil
procedure simplifying pleading and merging law and equity, the bar was
faced with the necessity of learning two different systems of pleading to
practice in both federal and state courts. To prevent this difficulty,
Congress enacted the Conformity Act, specifying that “the practice,
pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding” in federal trial courts in
civil cases, other than equity and admiralty cases, “shall conform as near as
may be” to those of state courts in the state in which they sat.221
The Court was soon faced with the question whether, under the
Conformity Act, federal trial courts had to follow state rules prohibiting
judicial summing up or comment on evidence. In 1875, months after the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act and the Judiciary Act, as Republicans
were expanding federal jurisdiction and seeking a strong national judiciary,
the Court gave a powerful answer.222 “The personal conduct and
administration of the judge in the discharge of his separate functions” was
not a practice, pleading, form, or mode of proceeding under the Act.223 The
Act was simply intended to have the federal courts follow the code
pleading of the states in which they sat, when practicable. The Act did not
require federal trial judges to follow state laws limiting their power to
comment on evidence. The Court’s opinion went further and suggested it
might not be possible for Congress to limit the trial judge’s power to
comment, even if that was its intent. If the legislature had tried to limit the
judge in this respect, “the powers of the judge, as defined by the common
law, were largely trenched upon.”224 The Court warned, “There are certain
powers inherent in the judicial office.”225 These stern statements were far
from the more state-centered views of the Court in the 1850s. In the 1870s,
the Supreme Court made it possible for federal courts to assert control over
juries, and by extension, counsel.
At the same time as the justices were confirming the power of federal
trial judges to comment on evidence under the Conformity Act, they were
strengthening the ability of those judges to engage in an extreme form of

221.
Id. § 5; see Bellia & Clark, supra note 155, at 655–56; Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 441
(1875).
222.
Nudd, 91 U.S. at 441–42.
223.
Id. at 442. Citing Nudd v. Burrows, the Court the next year rejected a demand that the federal
trial court administer special interrogatories to a jury after a general verdict, following state law. Horst,
93 U.S. at 299-301. In Horst, the demand was made by counsel for the defendant, a railroad, in a
personal injury case involving allegations of contributory negligence. The Court’s decisions concerning
the Conformity Act did not always favor railroads. See also St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Vickers,
122 U.S. 360, 363 (1887) (citing Nudd in holding that state law cannot prohibit a federal judge from
commenting on evidence).
224.
Nudd, 91 U.S. at 442.
225.
Id.
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comment: directed verdict. In a previous article, I discussed growing use of
the directed verdict procedure in the nineteenth century to combat the
perceived bias of juries, and to promote predictability in the law.226 The
Supreme Court emphasized the need for federal trial judges to control
juries: “It is the duty of the court in relation to the jury to protect parties
from unjust verdicts arising from ignorance of the rules of law and of
evidence, from impulse of passion or prejudice, or from any other violation
of his lawful rights in the conduct of a trial.”227 Directed verdicts spared the
necessity of the expensive and time-consuming remedy of new trial.228
Comment on evidence, many hoped, would have some of the same benefits
as directed verdict, in a broader range of cases.229
Personal injury cases brought against railroads or manufacturers raised
special concerns about jury bias.230 The practices in federal courts gave
judges considerably more control over juries than in most state courts.
Although directed verdict and comment on evidence often worked in favor
of defendant railroads and manufacturers, federal trial judges also used
their powers of judicial comment in favor of plaintiffs. The Supreme Court
consistently held that such comments were unreviewable.231
By 1887, the Court was defining the constitutional phrase “trial by
jury” to mean a trial in which the judge could comment on evidence if he
chose.232 In United States v. Philadelphia & Railroad Co., the Court upheld
the trial judge’s instruction to the jury that “while the court does not desire
to control your finding, but submits the question to you, it is of the opinion
that you should not, under the circumstances, find for the plaintiff.”233 The
Court continued this constitutional definition in later cases, in stronger
terms.234 In 1930 the Supreme Court declared that the phrase “trial by jury”

226.
Lerner, Directed Verdict, supra note 24, at 488–89.
227.
Pleasants v. Fant, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 116, 121 (1874) (upholding a directed verdict).
228.
Lerner, Directed Verdict, supra note 24, at 489.
229.
For a justification of comment on evidence based on the need for a trial judge to consider a
motion for a new trial because of a verdict against the evidence, see Consequa v. Willings, 6 F. Cas.
336, 337 (C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 3128).
230.
Lerner, Directed Verdict, supra note 24 at 486-89.
231.
See, e.g., Vicksburg, 118 U.S. at 553-54 (declaring unreviewable the trial judge’s comments to
the jury giving his opinion that the defendant railroad was negligent in maintaining tracks).
232.
“Trial by jury in the courts of the United States is a trial presided over by a judge, with
authority, not only to rule on objections to evidence, and to instruct the jury upon the law, but also,
when in his judgment the due administration of justice requires it, to aid the jury by explaining and
commenting upon the testimony, and even giving them his opinion upon questions of fact.”
Philadelphia & R.R. Co., 123 U.S. at 114.
233.
Id. at 117.
234.
Capitol Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1899) (“‘Trial by jury’ in the primary and
usual sense of the term at the common law and in the American constitutions . . . is a trial by a jury of
12 men in the presence and under the superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct them on the
law and advise them on the facts . . . .”).
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meant jury trial as understood and applied at common law, which required,
among other things, “that the trial should be in the presence and under the
superintendence of a judge having power to instruct them [the jury] as to
the law and advise them in respect of the facts.”235 These elements, the
Court announced, were beyond the power of the legislature to alter.236 The
trial judge’s power to comment on evidence was an essential element of
jury trial under both the Sixth and Seventh Amendments.237
B. Review of Capital Cases in the Supreme Court: 1889
In 1889, as the number of judgments of circuit courts held by single
judges grew, Congress acted to help redress the problem of a lack of appeal
in criminal cases.238 The 1889 Act altered the jurisdiction of certain courts.
Most important, under the Act, the Supreme Court could review federal
convictions for capital crimes.239
1. Judge Isaac Parker and the Origins of the 1889 Act
Congress had long been concerned about a lack of review in criminal
cases. The provision of the 1889 Act, however, was specially motivated by
anxiety about—even hostility toward—a particular judge, together with
questions about jurisdiction in Indian Territory and Indian policy. These
concerns were closely related to appellate control of judicial comment on
evidence, as will be seen later in the discussion of cases in the Supreme
Court from the Western District of Arkansas.
The provision of the 1889 Act was passed in part to control a single
judge: the federal district judge for the Western District of Arkansas, Isaac
Parker (1838-1896).240 The Western District of Arkansas had an unusual
jurisdiction which included large parts of the Indian Territory, in what is
now Oklahoma. The federal courts for this area had jurisdiction over
235.
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 289 (1930) (holding that a criminal defendant may
waive the right to a 12-person jury where one of the jurors is excused because of illness during the
trial).
236.
Id. at 290. “These common law elements are embedded in the constitutional provisions above
quoted, and are beyond the authority of the legislative department to destroy or abridge.” Id.
237.
Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 650 n.4 (1948).
238.
Act of Feb. 6, 1889, c. 113, 25 Stat. 655 (“An act to abolish circuit court powers of certain
district courts of the United States, and to provide for writs of error in capital cases, and for other
purposes.”).
239.
Id.§ 6.
240.
Parker is hardly an obscure figure in the literature of the American West. He has been the
subject of a half dozen biographies. For a historiography of Parker, see ROGER H. TULLER, “LET NO
GUILTY MAN ESCAPE”: A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY OF “HANGING JUDGE” ISAAC C. PARKER 3-9 (2001).
Parker is, however, not well-known in the federal courts literature, and his role in provoking restrictions
on comment in federal courts has been overlooked.
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crimes committed by or against non-Indians in the Indian Territory.241
(According to treaties, Indian tribal courts had jurisdiction over crimes
committed by Indians against Indians.242)
Isaac Parker began his judgeship in circumstances that were, to put it
mildly, difficult. His immediate predecessor as district judge was William
Story, a corrupt and incompetent hack. Story had freed condemned
prisoners on bond pending execution.243 In 1874, Story resigned to avoid
impeachment for taking bribes.244 Many perceived the Indian Territory as a
place where law was not enforced, especially during the tenure of Judge
Story, and the area attracted and nurtured notorious gangs and outlaws. The
lack of effective extradition laws caused fugitives from justice to flock
there.245 Murders, robberies, rapes, and horse thefts were commonplace.246
It was popularly known as “Robbers’ Roost” and the “Land of the SixShooter.”247
In May 1875, Isaac Parker arrived at Fort Smith, Arkansas as the new
district judge. He had served as a Missouri state judge and a U.S.
Congressman for Missouri. While in Congress, he had championed
Indians’ rights and become known as “the Indians’ best friend.”248 He was
determined to create order and respect for law in the Indian Territory. On
September 3, 1875, six persons he had sentenced to death—three whites,
two Indians, and a black—were hanged at once, all for murder. The

241.
Act of June 30, 1834, c. 161, § 1, 4 Stat. 729, 729 (the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act). In
1790, in the Trade and Intercourse Act, Congress extended the criminal jurisdiction of federal courts to
U.S. citizens in “Indian Country,” including Indian Territory. Act of July 22, 1790, c. 33, §§ 5 & 6, 1
Stat. 137, 138. In 1817, Congress enacted a statute that became known as the Federal Enclaves Act,
which extended federal jurisdiction over Indians who committed crimes against non-Indians. 18 U.S.C.
§1152 (2016). This provision was codified in the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act, supra. I thank
Gregory Ablavsky for this information. In 1851, the new Western District of Arkansas was given
jurisdiction over part of the Indian Territory. Act of Mar. 3, 1851, c. 23, 9 Stat. 594.
242.
In 1885, Congress enacted the General Crimes Act, 23 Stat. 385, which extended federal
jurisdiction to certain major crimes committed by Indians against Indians in Indian country. The statute
was prompted by concerns about the actions of a Sioux tribal court in a murder case, permitted to stand
by the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). See SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW
DOG’S CASE 129-141 (1994).
243.
TULLER, supra note 240, at 63.
244.
GLENN SHIRLEY, LAW WEST OF FORT SMITH 16-17 (1968).
245.
TULLER, supra note 240, at 47–48; SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 21.
246.
The editor of Fort Smith’s Western Independent despaired. “We have lived in and around the
Indian country since the spring of 1834, but have never known such a state of terror. Now it is murder
throughout the length and breadth of the Indian country. It has been the rendezvous of the vile and
wicked from everywhere, an inviting field for murder and robbery . . . . Stealing horses is an everyday
occurrence, and murder and robbery seem equal to that sin. It is dangerous to travel alone where villains
from four quarters of the United States congregate to murder, rob and steal.” Editorial, WESTERN
INDEPENDENT (Fort Smith), Aug. 28, 1873, quoted in SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 23.
247.
SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 24.
248.
TULLER, supra note 240, at 34–41; SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 27–28.
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morning of the executions, over 5,000 persons packed the jail yard.249 The
executions attracted national attention and unfavorable coverage in the
press in other parts of the country. A reporter for Fort Smith’s Western
Independent expressed the local view: The men died because “they are
preying wolves upon the lives and property of their fellow beings, unfit to
live and unsafe to remain at large,” a fact which “should not be lost in the
excitement and glare of the terrible exhibition.”250 Parker’s effectiveness
and incorruptibility won enthusiastic support from the local press, even
from papers initially skeptical of him.251
A crucial element of Parker’s law enforcement efforts were the deputy
marshals. During Parker’s tenure on the bench, about 200 deputy marshals
were appointed, of whom around 40 or 50 served at a given time. The
deputies were tasked with policing and arrests.252 At the end of his life,
Parker stated that during his time as a judge, 65 of the deputy marshals in
his district were killed performing their duties.253 Parker seems to have
understated the carnage; modern scholarly estimates range from 75 to 100
deputy marshals killed in the district during that time.254 It is difficult to
understand what motivated so many men to take such a dangerous job. The
deputies seem to have taken pride in being one of “the men who rode for
Parker.”255 Evading arrest in the Indian Territory was an elaborate and
frequent activity, known as “scouting.”256 Gangs often had elaborate
lookout systems for deputy marshals. Adding to the difficulty of arresting
violent criminals, gangs had often so intimidated the population that many
ordinary persons helped to conceal fugitives and impeded deputy
marshals.257 Parker persevered, with the help of the deputies, and more
executions followed.258 In many the of murder trials Parker presided over,
the victim was a deputy marshal. As will be seen, Parker commented

249.
SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 35–40; TULLER, supra note 240, at 53.
250.
Report of J.W. Weaver, quoted in SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 40.
251.
SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 62.
252.
The movie “True Grit,” starring John Wayne in the 1969 version, and Jeff Bridges in the 2010
version, is thought to be based on the activities of Henry “Heck” Thomas, a U.S. deputy marshal during
Parker’s tenure.
253.
SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 47.
254.
MICHAEL J. BRODHEAD, ISAAC C. PARKER: FEDERAL JUSTICE ON THE FRONTIER 42 (2003)
[hereinafter BRODHEAD, PARKER].
255.
BRODHEAD, PARKER supra note 254. Another motivation may have been the illegal advantage
deputy marshals took in staking out claims before the official opening of the Unassigned Lands in
Indian Territory to settlement. See William W. Howard, The Rush to Oklahoma, HARPER’S WEEKLY,
May 18, 1889, at 391-92.
256.
Supreme Court opinions concerning appeals from Judge Parker’s court refer to the practice of
“scouting.” See, e.g., Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S. 442, 444 (1893); Hickory v. United States, 160
U.S. 408, 411 (1896).
257.
SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 41–64.
258.
TULLER, supra note 240, at 63–64; SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 61–62.
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powerfully to juries about the need to deter killers of deputy marshals,
comments which drew the disapproval of the Supreme Court.
Parker’s actions drew attention to the lack of appeals to federal courts
in criminal cases. He also incurred the hostility of members of Congress
who wanted to open the Indian Territory to more settlement. Parker
opposed non-Indian expansion into the Indian Territory and supported the
titles of the tribes and the jurisdiction of tribal courts.259 The possibility of
opening the Unassigned Lands—lands that had not been assigned to any
tribe—in Indian Territory to non-Indian settlement had long been a
contentious political issue. The law reformers and expansionists together
succeeded in passing the Act of 1889. Parker was clearly a trigger. Both
sponsors of the bill, Senator James K. Jones and Representative John
Rogers, represented Arkansas. Senator George Vest of Missouri, an
enthusiastic supporter of non-Indian settlement in Indian Territory, singled
out Parker in a speech in favor of the bill. Vest argued that Parker had
executed men for years “without any right to ask the Supreme Court of the
United States whether it be judicial murder or not.”260 Less than a month
after the act was signed providing appeals in capital cases to the U.S.
Supreme Court, President Grover Cleveland signed an act permitting nonIndian settlement in the Unassigned Lands in Indian Territory beginning at
a specific date and time.261 The Oklahoma land rush, an extraordinary
episode in American history, accordingly started at noon on April 22,
1889.262
With the arrival of appeals in criminal cases to the Supreme Court,
Parker’s practices of addressing juries came under judicial scrutiny. The
result was a significant change in rules concerning judicial comment on
evidence.
2. Change in Review of Judicial Comment
It was the advent of review of criminal cases—at a time when almost
no justices traveled circuit and heard trials any longer—that undid the rule
that the Supreme Court would not consider a trial court’s comments on
evidence. To my knowledge, scholars have not discussed this change, nor
the role that Isaac Parker played in provoking it. For only a few years,
between 1889 and 1897, the Supreme Court regularly heard first appeals of
259.
SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 140–41.
260.
19 CONG. REC. 5611 (1888).
261.
Indian Appropriations Act of 1889, c. 412, 25 Stat. 980 (signed March 2, 1889).
262.
Harper’s Weekly published a fascinating account. “Unlike Rome, the city of Guthrie
[Oklahoma] was built in a day. To be strictly accurate in the matter, it might be said that it was built in
an afternoon. At twelve o’clock on Monday, April 22d, the resident population of Guthrie was nothing;
before sundown it was at least ten thousand.” Howard, supra note 255, at 391.
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capital murder cases. Prior to that, the Court essentially only heard a
criminal appeal if there was a division in the trial court. After that, the
Court routinely heard cases of tax fraud, drug distribution, and regulatory
crimes—and those mostly already heard in the circuit courts of appeals.
The unusual eight years strongly marked the practice of the federal courts
concerning judicial comment on evidence.
Early in this period, the Supreme Court suggested that the Court would
extend to criminal cases the rule about not reviewing a trial judge’s
comments on evidence. In a criminal case in 1891, the court applied the
longstanding rule that it would not review judicial comments on fact.263
That was a case of embezzlement from a bank.
Over the next few years, however, the Supreme Court decided a mass
of cases on review from the Western District of Arkansas and Judge Isaac
Parker. The cases from the Western District of Arkansas were not cases of
embezzlement from a bank. They were murders: capital cases. The stakes
were high, and the Court emphasized this. In these cases, the Court
fundamentally changed its method of review, and thoroughly examined
Parker’s statements to the jury on fact for undue influence. These cases
from the 1890s were cited repeatedly in later opinions of the Supreme
Court and of the circuit courts of appeal in overturning verdicts.
Isaac Parker was “a verdict-getting judge.”264 To many, he exemplified
the dangers of the single judge with unchecked power. He viewed himself
as primarily responsible for maintaining law and order in his district,
especially in the Indian Territory. He thought certainty of punishment was
more important in deterring crime than severity, and declared at the end of
his life that he would be happy to abolish the death penalty if crime
received more certain and swift punishment.265 He worked hard to maintain
a group of deputy marshals to do dangerous jobs and to take great risks,
and he wanted to make sure the deputies were rewarded by prompt trials of
the persons they arrested, “with a large percentage of convictions.”266

263.
Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148, 172–73 (1891) (citing Vicksburg in a criminal case
for embezzlement). In that case, the trial court had told the jury that “he regarded the testimony [against
the defendant] as convincing.” Id. at 172.
264.
The phrase is taken from New York lawyer Theron Strong and his description of New York
judge George C. Barrett. THERON G. STRONG, LANDMARKS OF A LAWYER’S LIFETIME 103 (1914).
265.
Isaac C. Parker, interview in St. Louis Republic, Sept. 6, 1896, at 6, quoted in TULLER, supra
note 240, at 156.
266.
Harry P. Daily, Judge Isaac C. Parker, 11 CHRONS. OF OKLA. (1933). On the dangers to the
deputy marshals, see supra text accompanying notes 252-257. The deputy marshals were paid primarily
for the arrest of wanted men, and were ineligible to receive federal rewards. The federal deputies could,
however, and often did, collect rewards from state and local authorities, private persons, and railroads
and other transportation companies. Parker frequently complained of the low official pay of the
deputies, and wrote to Congress to try to get higher pay for them. Parker explained that the costs to
deputy marshals were higher in the Indian Territories than in more settled parts of the country, in which
law enforcement could count on the support of the local population. SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 46.
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Parker’s charges to the jury in criminal cases were vigorous, often
lasting an hour and a half,267 sometimes quoting the Bible and using the
language of moral condemnation. In one case in which a defendant fled
following a killing, Judge Parker commented to the jury by reading several
passages from the Bible, including the story of Cain’s murder of Abel and a
verse from Proverbs: “The wicked flee when no man pursueth.”268 The
inhabitants of his district were varied and polyglot; over 30 tribes coexisted
in the Indian Territory, and there were also whites and blacks, and many of
mixed ancestry. Parker believed it necessary to explain basic principles of
law and treaties to juries in the area and to give detailed guidance in his
lengthy charges. Parker responded vigorously to his critics: “I have been
accused of leading juries. I tell you a jury should be led . . . if they are
guided they will render justice.”269 Parker worked to ensure that jurors were
properly paid for their service, and he expressed his gratitude for their
undertaking the inconvenience and burdens.270 Henry Starr—a halfCherokee gang leader who was twice convicted of murder in Parker’s court
and went on to a lucrative career as a bank robber after the Supreme Court
reversed his convictions—had a different opinion of these jurors. Starr,
however, agreed about Parker’s influence: “Arkansas is noted for ignorance
and Hill-Billyism, and fifty percent of the jurymen were drawn from
backwoods counties and were completely dominated by the powerful
personality of Judge Parker.”271
It is possible that Parker was reacting in his charges to the newly
aggressive defense lawyers who had begun to practice in his court. The
most effective of these was J. Warren Reed, a West Virginian who arrived
in Fort Smith in 1889272 and soon discovered the value of an appeal to the
Supreme Court. He was the first defense counsel to appeal a murder
conviction from Parker to the Supreme Court, and he won a reversal in
1891.273 He also aggressively applied to the President for executive
clemency. Other lawyers rapidly joined Reed as news of his success
spread.274 Because of Parker’s activities, there was a ready supply of clients
waiting at the jail.

267.
TULLER, supra note 240, at 147. The Supreme Court, in reviewing one of Parker’s charges,
commented that it took up twenty pages of the printed record. Hickory, 160 U.S. at 409.
268.
Hickory, 160 U.S. at 415-16.
269.
Isaac C. Parker, interview in St. Louis Republic, Sept. 6, 1896, at 6, quoted in TULLER, supra
note 240, at 156.
270.
BRODHEAD, PARKER, supra note 254, at 50–51.
271.
Id. at 51.
272.
SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 147.
273.
Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353 (1891).
274.
SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 155.
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Between 1889 and 1897, 49 criminal cases from Parker’s court were
appealed to the Supreme Court, almost all convictions for capital murder.275
Of these 49, the Supreme Court affirmed 13 and reversed 36.276 Sometimes
the Court reversed a particular defendant’s conviction multiple times.
Several reversals were noteworthy for the Supreme Court’s treatment of
Parker’s comments on evidence to the jury.
In 1893, on appeal from Judge Parker, the Court reversed a conviction
in part on the ground of judicial comments on fact.277 Some knowledge of
the facts is necessary to understand the judicial comments and reversal. In
Hicks v. United States, Hicks, a Cherokee, was tried for aiding and abetting
the murder of a white man, Colvard. At the time Colvard was killed, Hicks
and Rowe, another Cherokee, were evading U.S. marshals who had
warrants for their arrest. Hicks and Rowe were armed to resist arrest.278
Hicks and Rowe seem to have suspected Colvard was trying to apprehend
them, and Rowe shot and killed him. (Rowe was later killed by deputy
marshals trying to arrest him.) At Hicks’s trial, several witnesses testified
that Hicks had made statements at the time of the killing suggesting that he
expected and encouraged Rowe to shoot Colvard, and that after Rowe did
so, the two rode off together.279 Hicks testified that he had tried to persuade
Rowe not to shoot Colvard.280
Parker told the jury that they should consider Hicks’s interest in the
case in deciding whether his testimony was true.281 The Supreme Court was
concerned that a judge’s adverse comment on defendant’s testimony would
in effect take from him the ability to testify on his own behalf. Congress
had given criminal defendants the right to testify under oath in federal court

275.
Westlaw search. For proceedings begun after September 1, 1896, Congress ended direct review
of criminal cases from the Indian Territory by the Supreme Court, and provided appeals in lower courts.
Act of Mar. 1, 1895, c. 145, 28 Stat. 693 (providing for a special court of appeal for criminal cases in
the Indian Territory, composed of three district judges, with a further appeal to the circuit court of
appeal).
276.
Six of the reversals were on motion or confession of error of the Solicitor General. Davenport
v. United States, 163 U.S. 682 (1896); Goldsby v. United States, 163 U.S. 688 (1896); Luckey v.
United States, 163 U.S. 692 (1896); King v. United States, 164 U.S. 701 (1896); Thornton v. United
States, 163 U.S. 707 (1896); Kettenring v. United States, 168 U.S. 703 (1897).
277.
Hicks, 150 U.S. at 450–53.
278.
Id. at 444.
279.
Id. at 445–46.
280.
Id. at 446.
281.
Parker said, “You are to consider [defendant’s] interest in this case, you are to consider his
consequent motive growing out of that interest, in passing upon the truthfulness or falsity of his
statement. He is in an attitude, of course, where any of us, if so situated, would have a large interest in
the result of the case; the largest, perhaps, we could have under any circumstances in life; and such an
interest, consequently, as might cause us to make statements to influence a jury in passing upon our
case that would not be governed by the truth. We might be led away from the truth because of our
desire. Therefore it is but right, and it is your duty, to view the statements of such a witness in the light
of his attitude and in the light of other evidence.” Id. at 451.
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in 1878.282 In Hicks, the Court stated that the defendant’s privilege to
testify on his own behalf “would be a vain one if the judge, to whose
lightest word the jury, properly enough, give a great weight, should
intimate that the dreadful condition in which the accused finds himself
should deprive his testimony of probability. . . . The policy of this
enactment should not be defeated by hostile comments of the trial judge,
whose duty it is to give reasonable effect and force to the law.”283 The
Court believed such adverse comment was especially problematic because
it viewed the evidence against the defendant as weak.284 Judicial comment
on defendant’s testimony continued to be a point of special concern for
appellate courts, including later cases in the Supreme Court reversing Judge
Parker.285
In Hicks, Justice David Brewer, with Justice Henry Brown dissented
strongly, arguing that the Court should adhere to the longstanding rule that
a judgment would not be reversed because of a judge’s comments on
fact.286 Brewer rejected the idea that the judge had to be especially careful
about comment on the defendant’s testimony: “The statute makes the
defendant a competent witness. It affirms nothing as to his credibility.”287
Brewer, like his English counterparts, was concerned about the use of
appeals in criminal cases to reverse convictions on technical grounds.288
In later cases of appeals from Judge Parker, the Court admonished
Parker for his general tone of “indignation.” In Starr v. United States,
Henry Starr shot to death a deputy marshal who was trying to arrest him on
a warrant for horse theft.289 Starr claimed he had shot the deputy in selfdefense. On appeal, Chief Justice Fuller observed that the “circumstances

282.
Act of Mar. 16, 1878, c. 37, 20 Stat. 30.
283.
Hicks, 150 U.S. at 452.
284.
Id.
285.
See Allison v. United States, 160 U.S. 203, 209–10 (1895) (reversing murder conviction for
Judge Parker’s improper comment on defendant’s testimony); Hickory, 160 U.S. at 424–25 (reversing
murder conviction for killing a deputy marshal trying to arrest defendant for Judge Parker’s improper
comment on defendant’s testimony). In Allison, the Court was also concerned that Parker’s summing up
did not discuss testimony about a fact favorable to the accused, which was not contradicted. “Justice
and the law demanded that, so far as reference was made to the evidence, that which was favorable to
the accused should not be excluded.” Allison, 160 U.S. at 212.
286.
Hicks, 150 U.S. at 453–60. Brewer, Brown, and Rufus Peckham were frequent dissenters in
reversals of convictions on appeal from Judge Parker. See, e.g., Hickory v. United States, 151 U.S. 303,
317 (1894).
287.
Id. at 459.
288.
TULLER, supra note 240, at 154; MICHAEL J. BRODHEAD, DAVID J. BREWER: THE LIFE OF A
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE, 1837-1910, at 111-13 (1994) [hereinafter BRODHEAD, BREWER]. Brewer’s
antipathy toward crime and criminals arose partly from his strong Christian beliefs (he was the son of
New England missionaries), and partly from his experiences as a young lawyer and judge in the new
state of Kansas in the early1860s. BRODHEAD, BREWER, supra, at 1-3, 11-12. Brodhead has called
Brewer “Parker’s only consistent friend on the Supreme Court.” Id. at 111-12.
289.
Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 615 (1894).
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of this case apparently aroused the indignation of the learned judge in an
uncommon degree.”290 Parker had expressed himself strongly to the jury on
the subject of dangers to deputy marshals. He told the jury, “Without these
officers, what is the use of this court? It takes men who are brave to enforce
the law here. . . . [T]here is no protection unless the law is upheld by men
of this kind . . . .” 291 Fuller expressed the Court’s “disapprobation” of
these comments and denied that different methods of instructing a jury
might be appropriate in different areas of the country. “Whatever special
necessity for enforcing the law in all its rigor there may be in a particular
quarter of the country,” the rules and manner of the administration of
justice should be the same everywhere, and “argumentative matter of this
sort should not be thrown into the scales by the judicial officer who holds
them.”292
Relations between the Supreme Court and Judge Parker escalated into a
forensic battle. In 1895, the infamous gang leader Cherokee Bill (whose
real name was Crawford Goldsby) killed the jailer at Fort Smith while in
jail awaiting review by the Supreme Court of his conviction for a previous
murder. Parker pointedly criticized the Supreme Court in a statement to a
newspaper in St. Louis, where he was visiting relatives.293 He asked why,
when crime generally was decreasing in the Indian Territories, murder had
increased. He attributed the rise in murders to reversals of convictions by
the Supreme Court.294 These reversals undermined the swiftness and
certainty of punishment that he—like the English judges—thought so
important to deterrence.295 “First, the convicted murderer has a long
breathing spell before his case comes before the Supreme Court; then,
when it does come before that body, the conviction may be quashed; and
wherever it is quashed it is always upon the flimsiest technicalities. The
Supreme Court never touches the merits of the case.”296
Parker attributed the Supreme Court’s reversals to the lack of
experience of most of the justices with criminal cases. He referred to the
justices’ inexperience with criminal cases repeatedly, most notably in an
interview with a reporter shortly before his death: “The justices are men
290.
Id. at 626. Fuller continued, “and that indignation was expressed in terms which were not
consistent with due regard to the right and duty of the jury to exercise an independent judgment in the
premises, or with the circumspection and caution which should characterize judicial utterances.” Id.
291.
Parker continued: “You are to stand by the nation. You are to say to all the people that no man
can trample upon the law, wickedly, violently, and ruthlessly; that it must be upheld if it has been
violated.” Id. at 627.
292.
Id. at 627–28.
293.
Isaac C. Parker, statement to the Globe-Democrat (St. Louis), July 30, 1895, at 9, quoted in
SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 156.
294.
Id.
295.
Id.
296.
Id. at 156–57.
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from civil walks of life; it is not then surprising that they are liable to err in
criminal cases.”297 Such inexperienced persons were apt to “utterly forget
the hardened character of the criminals I have to deal with,” to forget the
family the convict made fatherless.298
The Court, in Starr and in other cases, remarked on the youth of the
defendants;299 Starr was 18 when he shot the deputy marshal.300 After
shooting the deputy marshal and before he was arrested seven months later,
Starr used his new notoriety to organize a well-known gang which
committed a string of robberies and horse thefts.301 The Court’s reversal of
his conviction spared Starr from hanging; on retrial, a jury convicted Starr
again, and again the Supreme Court reversed the conviction for Parker’s
instructions to the jury on how to weigh the flight of the accused.302
An important point of difference between the opinions for the Court
and for the dissent concerned beliefs about the effect of judicial comment
on the jury. Different views on this subject permeated debates about
comment on evidence, among courts and commentators. In Hicks, the
Court stated that the jury gave the judge’s “lightest word . . . great
weight.”303 In contrast, Brewer credited the jury with independence of
thought.304 Earlier, in 1851, Chief Justice Roger Taney had pointed out an
apparent contradiction in the argument of those who supported restrictions
on judicial comment. Taney denied that the trial court’s comments would
have “an undue and improper influence” on the jury’s minds and
decision.305 He observed that such an objection “questions their intelligence
and independence, qualities which cannot be brought into doubt without

297.
Isaac C. Parker, interview in St. Louis Republic, Sept. 6, 1896, at 6, quoted in TULLER, supra
note 240, at 156.
298.
Id.
299.
See, e.g., Allison, 160 U.S. at 203 (defendant was about 20 years old at the time of the killing);
Hickory, 160 U.S. at409 (defendant was 19 years old at the time of the killing).
300.
Starr, 153 U.S. at 615.
301.
SHIRLEY, supra note 244, at 175–80.
302.
Starr v. United States, 164 U.S. 627, 631–32 (1897); see also Hickory, 160 U.S. at 414–23.
After Starr was convicted for murder a third time before a different judge and was serving a sentence in
prison, President Theodore Roosevelt pardoned hin in 1903 because of his role in encouraging the
surrender of his fellow inmate, Crawford Goldsby (“Cherokee Bill”), during an attempted jailbreak in
1895. See BRODHEAD, PARKER, supra note 254, at 159. On the attempted jailbreak, see supra text
accompanying note 293. Following the reversals of his murder convictions and the pardon, Henry Starr
went on to a lucrative career as a bank robber. BRODHEAD, PARKER, supra note 254, at 159. He is
thought to have robbed at least 21 banks. A silent movie was made about him, released in 1919, called
“A Debtor to the Law.” In the movie, Henry Starr played himself. Id. at 187. In 1921, at the age of 46,
Starr was shot fatally while robbing a bank. Id. at 159.
303.
Hicks, 150 U.S. at 452.
304.
Id. at 459 (“Is it not clear that they [the jurors] would understand simply that their attention
was called to the effect on his [defendant’s] credibility of a contradiction between his testimony and
that of disinterested witnesses?”).
305.
Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 131 (1851).

33_LERNER_JCI (DO NOT DELETE)

264

5/19/2016 10:07 AM

The Journal of the Legal Profession

[Vol. 40:2

taking from that tribunal the confidence and respect which so justly belong
to it, in questions of fact.”306 In the late twentieth century, Judge Jack
Weinstein expressed the same opinion.307
C. Creation of an Intermediate Court of Appeals: 1891
1. The Evarts Act
For many years, the battles between the House and Senate discussed
above prevented federal legislation addressing the structure of the courts. In
1891, the stalemate broke and Congress passed the Circuit Court of
Appeals Act,308 known as the Evarts Act, creating an intermediate court of
appeals. William Evarts, an eminent lawyer and Republican senator from
New York who was chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, was
mainly responsible for the act.309
The sittings of the new circuit courts of appeal were to be held by
three-judge panels, with two judges constituting a quorum.310 On these
panels were eligible to sit the circuit judges of the circuit (now two per
circuit), district judges of the circuit, and the Supreme Court justice
assigned to the circuit.311 The Act reduced the mandatory appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in civil cases and made many cases
reviewable there only by certification of the circuit court of appeals or by
writ of certiorari.312 The justices got immediate relief, with a drop in their
caseload.313 The drop in review of civil cases more than compensated for an
increase in criminal appeals. The Evarts Act made convictions in any
“capital or otherwise infamous crime” directly appealable from the trial
court to the Supreme Court.314
Under the Evarts Act, the district courts became the primary trial
courts, but the old circuit courts were not abolished. The maintenance of
the circuit courts as trial courts was a critical concession. Evarts himself
regarded it as important to bring appellate judges “in contact with the

306.
Id.
307.
Weinstein, supra note 5, at 163. For a contrary view, see Saltzburg, supra note 7, at 39-40.
308.
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
309.
CHESTER L. BARROWS, WILLIAM M. EVARTS: LAWYER, DIPLOMAT, STATESMAN 480-83
(1941); BRAINERD DYER, THE PUBLIC CAREER OF WILLIAM M. EVARTS 257-60 (1933, republished
1969). Evarts became convinced of the necessity of an intermediate court of appeals partly because of
the persistent complaints and assiduous cultivation of Chief Justice Melville Fuller. Glick, supra note
164, at 1824–26.
310.
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, § 2.
311.
Id. § 3.
312.
Id. §§ 5, 6.
313.
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 198, at 102.
314.
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, § 5.
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profession and the suitors and the people in the courts of first instance as
frequently as possible.”315 Some Democrats were willing to support the
measure because circuit judges would continue to preside over jury trials
and “intermingle with the people.”316 Apparently it was enough for the
circuit judges, rather than the Supreme Court justices, to hear trials.
Although the Evarts Act did not entirely end circuit riding by justices, most
justices gave it up at that point.317
The compromise of maintaining the circuit trial courts was undone
because of the old problem of making sure that judges did not hear appeals
of cases they had decided below, combined with a new sense of strict
hierarchy in the federal courts. A district judge sometimes needed to sit on
the appellate court when a circuit judge had to recuse himself because of
having presided in the circuit trial court. This situation was not only an
administrative nuisance, but offended the growing sense of judicial
hierarchy. A report of the House Judiciary Committee in 1890 favored
abolishing the circuit trials courts in order to create a pure and distinct
three-tiered system. Abolition of the circuit trial courts and creation of an
intermediate court “secures the absolute independence . . . of the three
classes of courts, to wit, district, circuit, and Supreme.”318 Commentators
even compared the federal judiciary to the officer corps of the army, the
epitome of hierarchy: “It looks odd to see an inferior judge reverse his
superior—a captain reversing his general’s orders!”319
The growing sense of hierarchy in the federal courts echoed the
systematizing and increasingly strict hierarchy that railroads had adopted in
the late nineteenth century for their legal counsel. Railroads were the first
corporations to develop clear chains of command for legal services, in
order to handle the mass of litigation that railroads were constantly
involved in.320 The railroads usually used a three-tiered structure of general
counsel, division counsel (responsible for a group of states), and local
attorneys.321 This organization resembled the three-tiered structure
recommended for the federal courts. Many prominent lawyers in the late
nineteenth century—including both Lincoln and Evarts—had worked
extensively for railroads as either in-house counsel or outside counsel.
These lawyers were therefore increasingly used to hierarchies within the

315.
21 CONG. REC. 10,222 (1891) (statement of Senator William Evarts of New York).
316.
Id. at 10,231 (statement of Senator John T. Morgan of Alabama). On support for appellate
judges also hearing trials, see Holt, supra note 198, at 8.
317.
Glick, supra note 164, at 1829.
318.
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Jurisdiction of United States Courts, H. Rep. No. 1295 (1890),
quoted in Holt, supra note 198, at 7.
319.
Henry Wollman, The Danger of the Federal Judiciary, N. AM. REV., Mar. 1895, at 379.
320.
LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 1021, 1023.
321.
Id. at 1023.
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legal profession. Former and current railroad lawyers vigorously asserted
the need for judicial hierarchy in order to manage swelling caseloads.322
Although some representatives still argued for appellate judges
mingling with the people and making sure justice was done in the trial
courts,323 theirs was a losing cause. In 1911, Congress abolished the old
circuit courts and killed the justices’ circuit riding.324 In the federal courts,
trial judges and appellate judges were now distinct. Despite their equally
secure tenure, trial and appellate judges were increasingly viewed as
markedly different.
2. Later Cases in the Supreme Court Concerning
Comment on Evidence
After 1911, the Supreme Court mostly got out of the business of
reviewing trial judges’ comments to juries. That job went to the circuit
courts of appeal instead. We have seen that the Evarts Act in 1891 caused
most appeals in civil cases to go to the circuit courts of appeal, while
appeals in criminal cases went directly to the Supreme Court. After that,
Congress transferred criminal appeals to the circuit courts of appeal in two
stages. In 1897, Congress restricted review by the Supreme Court directly
from the trial court to capital cases. Other convictions went to the circuit
courts of appeal for review.325 In 1911, Congress eliminated direct review
of capital convictions by the Supreme Court; all criminal convictions were
reviewable in the circuit court of appeals.326 The Supreme Court got almost
complete control of its docket in 1925.327
Once the justices could pick which issues to decide, judicial comment
on evidence was rarely among them. Policing the comments of trial courts
was left mainly to the circuit courts. A later stage of this research will
examine the practices of the different circuits and regional variation among
them, together with the frequency and strength of comment in the trial
courts over time. The circuit courts of appeals frequently cited the opinions

322.
At the 1897 American Bar Association conference, former railroad lawyer James H. Raymond
argued that “the whole idea of a Court of Appeals is absolutely in its very integrity destroyed when any
officer . . . of that court also performs duty in an inferior court.” 1897 American Bar Association
Conference, at 62.
323.
Holt, supra note 198, at 12–13.
324.
Act of Mar. 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1087. The Judiciary Act of 1925 removed the Supreme
Court further from ordinary cases, by making most of its docket discretionary. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, c.
229, 43 Stat. 936. Writs of certiorari replaced mandatory appeals to the Court for almost all cases.
325.
Act of Jan. 20, 1897, c. 68, 29 Stat. 492.
326.
Act of Mar. 3, 1911, c. 231, § 5, 36 Stat. 1087, 1088.
327.
Act of Feb. 13, 1925, c. 229, 43 Stat. 936.
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of the Supreme Court reversing Judge Parker for his comments on
evidence.328
In a civil case in 1913, Justice Holmes expressed impatience about
“what seem to us meticulous objections to every detail in the conduct of the
trial,” and the Court upheld the trial court’s comments.329
In criminal cases, the Court occasionally overturned convictions,
relying heavily on previous opinions reversing Judge Parker. Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes wrote the opinion in the leading modern case,
Quercia v. United States,330 in 1933. Hughes explained that federal trial
judges have the power to comment on evidence, and quoted Matthew
Hale’s description of the practice’s value.331 He then warned that the
“privilege of the judge to comment on the facts has its inherent limitations.
His discretion is not arbitrary and uncontrolled, but judicial . . . . His
privilege of comment in order to give appropriate assistance to the jury is
too important to be left without safeguards against abuses.”332 There
followed a long string of descriptions of the holdings of the Court’s cases
reversing Judge Parker, with citations.333
In Quercia, a Narcotic Act case, the trial judge had observed the
defendant wiping his hands during his testimony and commented to the
jury that “that is almost always an indication of lying.”334 The First Circuit
had upheld the conviction. The Supreme Court condemned the trial judge’s
“sweeping denunciation” and did not doubt that it was “highly prejudicial.”
This error was not cured by the trial court’s statement that his opinion of
the evidence was not binding on the jury, the Court held, citing the reversal
of Judge Parker in Starr v. United States.335 Quercia is cited in almost

328.
See, e.g., Mullen v. United States, 106 F. 892, 895 (6th Cir. 1901) (reversing conviction and
citing Starr, Hickory, and Allison); Oppenheim v. United States, 241 F. 625, 629 (2d Cir. 1917)
(reversing conviction and citing Starr, Allison, and Hicks); Weare v. United States, 1 F.2d 617, 618 (8th
Cir. 1924) (reversing conviction and citing Starr and Hickory); O’Shaughnessy v. United States, 17
F.2d 225, 228 (5th Cir. 1927) (reversing conviction and citing Starr and Hickory); Malaga v. United
States, 57 F.2d 822, 827 (1st Cir. 1932) (reversing conviction and citing Starr, Hickory, Allison, and
Hicks).
329.
Graham v. United States, 231 U.S. 474, 480 (1913). The judge charged the jury “that it was
‘not a case for sentimental considerations of any kind,’ with more in the same direction.” Id. at 481.
330.
289 U.S. 466 (1933).
331.
Quercia, 289 U.S. at 469 (quoting HALE, supra note 42, at 291-92).
332.
Id. at 470.
333.
Id. at 470–71 (citing Hicks, Starr, Allison, and Hickory). The Court also acknowledged the
growing importance of the circuit courts of appeal in this area. Hughes described a rule that had
developed in the courts of appeal: When no testimony had been offered as to the previous character of
the accused, it was prejudicial error for the trial court to comment unfavorably on his general character.
Id. at 471 (citing cases from the courts of appeals).
334.
Id. at 468. “Why that should be so we don’t know, but that is the fact. I think that every single
word that man said, except when he agreed with the Government’s testimony, was a lie.” Id.
335.
Id. at 472 (citing Starr, 289 U.S. at 472).
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every decision by the courts of appeals concerning judicial comment on
evidence.
The Supreme Court swooped in once again in 1933, the same year as
Quercia, with the last significant opinion on comment on evidence.336 The
defendant was convicted of refusing to supply information concerning his
income tax returns. The trial court told the jury his opinion that the
defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.337 The Seventh Circuit
had reversed. The Court declared that, “[a]lthough the power of the judge
to express an opinion as to the guilt of the defendant exists,” it should be
exercised “cautiously” and “only in exceptional cases.”338 Essentially, the
Court suggested, that power should only be used in cases in which the facts
were undisputed, and the current case was not one of those.339
V. CONCLUSION
In the early twentieth century, legal commentators in the United States
remarked on a decline in the importance of jury trial. A prominent New
York state judge and other writers had called for the end of jury trial in
civil cases.340
Several authors at this time claimed that the only way to save jury trial
from terminal decline was to revive the power of trial judges to comment
on evidence. John Henry Wigmore wrote that the loss of judicial power to
comment on evidence “has done more than any other one thing to impair
the general efficiency of jury trial as an instrument of justice.”341 If the
power were restored, he predicted “[a] new birth of long life will then be
open for the great and beneficent institution of Trial by Jury.”342

336.
United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
337.
Id. at 393 (“So far as the facts are concerned in this case, Gentlemen of the Jury, I want to
instruct you that whatever the Court may say as to the facts, is only the Court’s view. You are at liberty
to entirely disregard it. The Court feels from the evidence in this case, that the Government has
sustained the burden cast upon it by the law and has proved that this defendant is guilty in manner and
form as charged beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
338.
Id. at 394.
339.
Id. (citing Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135 (1920)). Justices Stone and Cardozo
dissented without opinion. Id. at 398.
340.
Joseph M. Proskauer, A New Professional Psychology Essential for Law Reform, 14 A.B.A. J.
121, 123–24 (1928) (recommending abolition of jury trial in contract cases); George M. Hogan, The
Strangled Judge, 14 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 116, 116–17 & n.1 (1930) (describing and citing many
articles).
341.
5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 557, § 2551 (2d ed. 1923).
342.
Id. See also Hogan, supra note 340, at 117 (arguing that the public was getting impatient with
“the jury trial where the presiding judge is present but takes no part; . . . where opposing counsel stage a
game of emotional prejudice; . . . where juries are bewildered; and where justice miscarries” and
claiming that these problems would be solved by allowing trial judges the power to comment on
evidence).
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This article suggests that a return to robust powers to comment is
unlikely, even with relatively competent trial judges with secure tenure.
The creation of appellate courts with separate personnel, especially for
criminal appeals, significantly limits the discretion of trial courts in
commenting on evidence. Even English trial judges, with their considerable
prestige and long professional experience, have been restricted. They sum
up the evidence, and the summing up may be influential, but comment less
often than formerly.
The problem of how to guide or to control the jury turns out to be
virtually intractable. Strong judicial powers to comment invite the question
of why the legal system should use juries at all. In England in the
nineteenth century, judicial domination of verdicts through comment
caused the virtual elimination of civil jury trial. Prominent commentators
have suggested that potent judicial influence likewise calls into question
the continuation of the criminal jury.343 If juries are used, strong judicial
powers to comment may be abused, and constitute yet another ground of
appeal based on procedure, rather than the merits of a judgment. If, on the
other hand, judges do not comment, juries are left to their own devices in
resolving issues of fact, and are subject to confusion and bias caused by
counsel in the adversary system.

343.
WILLIAMS, supra note 85, at 307–08. Williams attributed the comparative success of the
English jury, relative to its American counterpart, to “the fact that our system of summing up enables
the judge to give the jury a lead, which the jury follow sufficiently often to give an appearance of
reliability to the mode of trial.” Id. at 307. He further observed: “It need hardly be pointed out that this
explanation of the jury’s success is not one that yields any very strong argument for a continuation of
the system.” Id.

